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government has brought marginal prosecutions, lured by RICO's procedural 
advantages and stepped-up penalty provisions. 8 
The Supreme Court has contributed to the proliferation of RICO cases. 
Prior to 1993, when the Court decided Reves v. Ernst&: Young,9 the Court had 
reviewed only four cases involving RICO's substantive provisions.10 In all four 
cases, the lower federal courts had limited RICO's broad language only to be 
reversed by the Supreme Court which adopted broad readings of RICO's 
statutory concepts.11 
In Reves, the Court, for the first time, affirmed a decision in which a lower 
federal court had given a narrowing interpretation to one of RICO's substantive 
provisions.12 Reves held that accountants who prepared an audit report for a 
farmers' cooperative did not "conduct" or "participate in the conduct" of the 
affairs of the farmers' cooperative for purposes of RICQ.13 The Court 
purported to rely on RICO's plain language despite the fact that federal circuits 
had developed four distinct definitions of "conduct" or "participate in the 
conduct. "14 As a result, it is hard to understand Reves as an interpretation of 
ATTORNEY'S MANUAL (1989) (discussing the prima facie case for a RICO violation). 
8 See Tarlow, supra note 3, at170. 
9 113 S. Ct. 1163 (1993) (holding that in order for a defendant to be guilty under 
RICO he or she must have participated in the operation or management of the enterprise). 
10 H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229 (1989) (holding that in order 
to prove a pattern of racketeering activity under RICO, a plaintiff or prosecutor must show 
at least two racketeering predicates that are related and that amount to, or threaten the 
likelihood of continued criminal activity); Sedima, S.P .R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479 
(1985) (holding that there was no support in the statute's history,language, or consideration 
of policy for a requirement that a private treble damages action could proceed only against a 
defendant who has already been criminally convicted. The Court also held that no 
"racketeering injury" is required.); Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16 (1983) (holding 
that interests subject to forfeiture under 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)(1) (1976) are not limited to 
interests in the enterprise and include "profits" and "proceeds"); United States v. Turkette, 
452 U.S. 576 (1981) (holding that RICO "enterprise" applies to both legitimate and 
illegitimate organizations). 
11 See i'!fra notes 70-111. 
12 Reves, 113 S. Ct. at1173-74, qff'd sub nom. Arthur Young & Co. v. Reves, 937 
F.2d 1310 (8th Cir. 1991). 
13 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1988); Reves, 113 S. Ct. at 1173. 
14 Reves, 113 S. Ct. at 1169; see Yellow Bus Lines, Inc. v. Drivers, Chauffeurs & 
Helpers Local Union 639, 913 F.2d 948 (D.C. Cir. 1990), cert. denied, SOl U.S. 1222 
(1991); Bennett v. Berg, 710 F.2d 1361 (8th Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1008 
(1983); United States v. Cauble, 706 F .2d 1322 (Sth Cir. 1983); United States v. Scotto, 
641 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 961 (1981); see also Bank of America 
Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n v. Touche Ross & Co., 782 F.2d 966 (11th Cir. 1986). Bank of 
America may demonstrate a fifth approach to defining 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) terms "conduct" 
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clear statutory language. 
Reves is permeated with important policy considerations. For example, 
plaintiffs in cases like Reves sue professionals because the primary wrongdoers 
are often insolvent.15 The professionals' culpability may be minor when 
compared to that of the primary wrongdoers. However, under principles of 
joint and several liability, the professionals are still liable for full damages, 
trebled.16 Another unstated concern may have been the expanding use of RICO 
in cases involving securities fraud, an area exhaustively regulated by 
CongressP Broad interpretation of RICO can threaten "fundamental precepts" 
of specialized areas of the law, "dramatically alter[ing] our legal terrain" 
without evidence that Congress intended to do so.1s But even judged by the 
Court's other RICO decisions, which were usually silent on policy implications 
of the Court's holding, Reves left untouched significant policy questions.l9 
This Article reviews RICO's treatment in earlier Court decisions to explain 
why the Reves Court may have decided to limit RIC0.20 Insofar as Reves was 
intended to limit RICO, it takes only a tentative step toward that goal. 
Although the Court defined the "conduct" and "participate in the conduct" 
language, it did so in a case in which the underlying predicate offenses 
involved omission liability under the securities law.21 The Court left 
unresolved significant questions involving the breadth of its own decision. 22 
and "participate in the conduct." Bank of America, 782 F.2d at 970. Bank of America 
rejected &nnett's "operation" or "management test"; Bank of America supported its 
holding based on the decision in United States v. Martino, 648 F.2d 367, 402-03 (5th Cir. 
1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 947 (1982), that "conduct" "simply means the performance 
of activities necessary or helpful to the operation of the enterprise." /d. It is unclear whether 
the test employed in Martino is the same as the test employed in Scotto. Martino, 648 F.2d 
at402-03. 
15 See generally Reves, 113 S. Ct. at 1168; Bank of America, 782 F.2d at 968 (The 
primary wrongdoer, International Horizons, filed for bankruptcy before suit was filed.). 
16 See, e.g., Fleischhauer v. Feltner, 879 F.2d 1290, 1300 (6th Cir. 1989) (holding 
that the nature of the RICO offense mandates joint and several liability), cert. denied, 493 
u.s. 1074 (1990). 
17 See Yellow Bus Lines, Inc., 913 F.2d at 956-57 (Milcva, J., concurring) (discussing 
the extent of federal securities regulation); Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 
523 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
18 Yellow Bus Lines, Inc. , 913 F .2d at 955. 
19 See infra part V.B. 
20 See infra notes 81-111. 
21 See infra notes 147-51. 
22 Reves v. Ernst & Young, 113 S. Ct. 1163, 1173 n.9 (1993). The first question left 
open by the Court is the following: While rejecting a restrictive "upper management" test, 
the Court left open how far down the ladder liability runs. /d. The Court left open a second 
question when it stated in dicta that "(a]n enterprise also might be 'operated' or 'managed' 
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Given the unresolved issues and the Court's unwillingness to address 
important policy considerations, lower federal courts and commentators have 
differed widely on Reves• meaning.23 This Article examines post-Reves 
decisions and argues that courts have demonstrated more hostility towards civil 
RICO than fidelity to Reves. This Article highlights two lines of post-Reves 
decisions: the first, which reads Reves as having created a rule exempting 
providers of professional services from liability under § 1962(c);24 the second, 
which interprets Reves as requiring an individual to have responsibility for 
directing another person in order to be liable under § 1962(c).25 Both lines of 
post-Reves decisions seriously misconstrue Reves and are inconsistent with 
Rico·s history. 
Questions left open by Reves will necessitate a reexamination of the 
eourt•s decision.26 This Article concludes by urging a framework of analysis 
for § 1962(c) that would return RICO more closely to specific situations 
contemplated by RICO's drafters.27 Specifically, depending on how the Court 
interprets the "operation" part of its "operation or management" test, the Court 
may exempt from liability some of the Mafia foot soldiers whom Congress 
certainly intended to include within RICO's substantive provisions.28 This 
Article argues that many of the analytical problems under § 1962(c) can be 
resolved consistent with legislative history by focusing on the appropriate mens 
rea. Imposing a mens rea requirement is consistent with the language and intent 
of the statute and provides more comprehensive limitations on RICO than those 
by others 'associated with • the enterprise who exert control over it or, for example, by 
bribery." /d. at 1173. The observation invites more questions than it answers. For example, 
are some bribers so influential that they really manage the enterprise, while other bribers 
have too little influence to come within 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c)? Or are all bribers who meet 
other requirements of§ 1962(c) within the Court's management test simply by their act of 
bribery? The Court also suggested a third question of uncertainty when it stated that § 
1962(c) "cannot be interpreted to reach complete 'outsiders.'" /d. At the same time, the 
Court stated that § 1962(c) does reach those outsiders who do manage the affairs of the 
enterprise. /d. The Court gives little guidance to explain how an outsider may violate § 
1962(c) other than by stating that it covers those who manage the enterprise's affairs. /d. at 
1173, 1178. However, this is a largely circular explanation. The Court also left open 
whether a person who does not manage or operate the enterprise may nonetheless be found 
liable as an accomplice or co-conspirator. /d. at 1169- 70. 
23 See infra part VI. 
24 See infra part VI.A. 
25 See infra part VI.B. 
26 See G. Robert Blakey & Marc Haefner, Did Reves Give Professionals a Sqfe-
Harbor Under RICO?, CIV. RICO REP., Aug. 11, 1993, at 1. 
27 See infra part vn. 
28 See infra part n. 
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during wartime by selling black-market gasoline rations, by running illegal 
gambling or prostitution operations, or by selling drugs.35 
In 1965, President Johnson signed an executive order creating the 
President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice 
(the Katzenbach Commission) to study organized crime. 36 The Katzenbach 
Commission's report led to the eventual passage of The Organized Crime 
Control Act of 1970 and presents strong evidence of the evil that Congress 
attempted to address when it enacted RICQ.37 
The Katzenbach Commission, although not without some vacillation, 
focused on "an entity with particular members, a defined hierarchy, and even 
an official name. "38 La Cosa Nostra was not only dangerous because of its size 
but also because of its infiltration into legitimate businesses and into labor 
organizations. The Commission's report was not concerned generally with the 
cost of crime on American society but specifically with the special harm 
associated with organized crime that used its economic power to "undermine 
free competition. "39 Organized crime was especially dangerous because it 
sought monopoly power by force and by investment in "legitimate, [economic], 
and political activities. "40 
The Commission went beyond the stereotype of the Mafia as 
3S See MAAs, supra note 33, at 185-94. 
36 See Lynch, supra note 2, at 666; TASK FORCE REPoRT, supra note 31, at 1. 
37 See Lynch, supra note 2, at 666. 
38 /d. at 668. 
Today the core of organized crime in the United States consists of 24 groups 
operating as criminal cartels in large cities across the Nation. Tileir membership is 
exclusively Italian, they are in frequent communication with each other, and their 
smooth fwtctioning is ensured by a national body of overseers .... FBI intelligence 
indicate~ that the organization as a whole has changed its name from the Mafia to La 
Cosa Nostra. 
/d. (citing TASK FORCE REPoRT, supra note 31, at 6-10). 
39 TASK FORCE REPoRT, supra note 31, at S; see also Johnson, Organized Crime: 
014lknge to 1M American Legal System (pt. 1), 53 J. CRIM. L., L. & P.S. 399, 406--07; 
Lynch, supra note 2, at 669; RONALD GoLDSTOCK, NEW YORK STATE ORGANIZED CRIME 
TASK FORCE, INTERIM REPoRT, CORRUPTION AND RACKETEERING IN THE NEW YORK CITY 
CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY 8 (1987) (presenting dramatic evidence of the continuing 
economic power of organized crime). Donald Cressey's working paper was more specific: 
"The danger of organized crime arises because the vast profits acquired from the sale of 
illicit goods and services are being invested in licit enterprises, in both the business sphere 
and the governmental sphere." Donald R. Cressey, 1he Functions and Structure of Criminal 
SyndicakS, in TASKFORCE REPoRT, supra note 31, at 25. 
40 Cressey, supra note 39, at 25. 
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unsophisticated hoodlums. The Mafia had matured so that it no longer had to 
rely as much as it once did on "hoods." It ran its affairs "more like a big 
business, a cartel. "41 The Commission underscored that the Mafia's economic 
success was the result not only of muscle and murder but also of power gained 
through monopolization, tax evasion, 42 real estate ventures, 43 and manipulation 
of law enforcement and the courts. 44 The wealth generated by such illegal 
activities was estimated to be in the billions of dollars. The Commission's 
report left no question that "[t]o succeed in such ventures, [the Mafia] uses 
accountants, attorneys, and business consultants, who in some instances work 
exclusively on its affairs. "45 As explained by Donald Cressey, the maturation 
of the Mafia required ceding power to professionals. 46 
While the Katzenbach Commission made no recommendations for 
substantive reform, 47 the substantive RICO offenses were the culmination of a 
series of proposed bills.48 Early in the legislative process, Senator Hruska 
introduced two bills, "generally considered ancestors of RICO. "49 In 
introducing the legislation, he identified organized crime, the monolithic Mafia, 
as a specific evil to be combated by that legislation. so Similar to the Katzenbach 
Commission, his other primary concern was the infiltration of legitimate 
businesses, even though his proposed legislation was not narrowly confined to 
the evils that he decried. 51 
During the next Congress, Senator McClellan introduced legislation also 
based on the Katzenbach Commission report, emphasizing procedural and 
evidentiary reform. Like Senator Hruska and the Commission, Senator 
McClellan identified the primary evils to be twofold: the threat of the 
41 /d. at 53. According to Cressey, "(w]e are now witnessing the passing of the days 
when the rulers of organized crime had to devote most of their time and intelligence to 
insuring that their members were not bad criminals." /d. 
42 See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 31, at 1. 
43 See id. at 4; see also MAAs, supra note 33, at 185-94; Cressey, supra note 39, at 54 
(describing the role of the "Money Mover" whose role was to launder illicit profits into 
other investments including "[i]mporting, real estate, trust funds, books, stocks and 
bonds"). 
44 See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 31, at 8. 
45 /d. at 4. 
46 See Cressey, supra note 39, at 51. 
47 See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 31, at 16. The laws of conspiracy have 
provided an effective substantive tool to confront the criminal groups. /d. 
48Jd. 
49 Lynch, supra note 2, at 673. 
50 See id. 
51 See id. at 674. 
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monolithic Mafia and its infiltration into legitimate businesses. 52 
RICO was largely modeled on a bill proposed in 1969 by Senators Hruska 
and McClellan. 53 The bill, according to Senator McClellan, was aimed at 
ridding organized crime of its influence over legitimate businesses. 54 A 
universal agreement exists that organized crime, and specifically the Mafia, was 
the primary target of the legislation. 55 Despite these concerns, RICO as enacted 
contains neither a definition of organized crime, 56 nor specific language 
limiting RICO to infiltration of legitimate businesses. 57 
Perhaps because the task seemed daunting, 58 Congress did not attempt to 
define in general terms the structural features of organized crime. 59 Instead, 
RICO outlawed what the Mafia did, 60 but the functional approach to 
criminalizing organized crime invited an open-ended statute.61 If nothing else 
was learned from 1he Valachi Papers and hearings into the conduct of the 
Mafia, it was that the Mafia was enormously adaptable, adopting almost any 
strategy to make money. 62 RICO would be rendered ineffective if organized 
crime was defined in terms of the old standby crimes associated with the Mafia, 
crimes like prostitution, gambling and murder for hire. The Mafia would 
simply move its operation into new money-making ventures. 63 
52 See id. at 675. 
53 See id. at 676. 
54 See id. at 6n. 
55 See id. at 669 (identifying that the primary target of RICO was organized crime). 
56 See H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 247 (1989). 
51 United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 593-94 (1981) ("Undoubtedly, the 
infiltration of legitimate business was of great concern .... "). With regard to the organized 
crime limitation, RICO almost necessarily had to be defined in broad terms. As pointed out 
by Attorney General Katzenbach, outlawing membership in La Cosa Nostra would almost 
certainly violate the Constitution. Crovitz, supra note 6, at 1052. 
58 See Lynch, supra note 2, at 685; Jonathan Turley, The RICO Lottery and the Gains 
Multiplication Approach: An AJ~rnative Measurement of Damages Under Qvil RICO, 33 
Vn..L. L. REv. 239, 241 n.12 (1988) ("RICO's drafters consciously avoided defining such 
terms as 'organized crime' or 'organized criminal' for both practical and strategic reasons. 
Practically, such a definition was thought to be fraught with constitutional and even racial 
difficulties •.•• "). 
59 See Lynch, supra note 2, at 687-88. 
60 See id. at 669, 920, 930. 
61 See generally TASKFORCE REPoRT, supra note 31, at 4-5. Senator McClellan stated 
that organized criminals are "sufficiently resourceful" to make impossible "an effective 
statute that reaches most of the commercial activities of organized crime, yet does not 
include offenses commonly committed by persons outside organized crime as well." 116 
CONG. REc. 18,940 (1970). 
62 SeeMAAS, supra note 33, at 185-94. 
63 See TASKFORCE REPoRT, supra note 31, at 4-5; see also Cressey, supra note 39, at 
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restrictively. 73 
Those decisions could cite ample legislative history that identified the 
specific goals of RICO's drafters and could plausibly conclude that a narrow 
interpretation of the statute was necessary to limit RICO to those goals. 74 
Further, the cases before the courts often posed difficult policy questions 
militating in favor of imposing limitations on RICO. For example, in Sedima, 
S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., the Second Circuit recognized that a broad reading of 
RICO would allow plaintiffs to "bring into federal courts many claims formerly 
subject only to state [court] jurisdiction, and to bypass remedial schemes 
created by Congress. "15 The Sedima court was also concerned that a liberal 
interpretation would result in a significant shift in federal-state relations without 
clear legislative intent supporting that shift. 76 
The First Circuit identified similar policy concerns in United States v. 
Turkette.71 In holding that § 1962(c) applied only to the operation of a 
legitimate business through a pattern of racketeering, the court rejected the 
government's "simplistic and literal interpretation" of the law.78 The Turkette 
court explained that adopting the government's approach to the definition of a 
RICO enterprise would make RICO boundless and would allow prosecutors to 
usurp state criminal law jurisdiction because it would equate a RICO violation 
to nothing more than a state law conspiracy. 79 As the court in Sedima, the 
Turkette court was not willing to infer such a result without stronger evidence 
of congressional intent to alter federal and state law enforcement 
responsibilities. 80 
Despite important policy concerns, efforts to limit RICO met with no 
success in the Supreme Court. Prior to Reves, the Court decided four cases 
interpreting RICO's substantive provisions; in each, the lower federal courts 
73 See, e.g., H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 829 F.2d 648 (8th Cir. 1987), 
rev'd, 492 U.S. 229 (1989); Superior Oil Co. v. Fulmer, 785 F.2d 252 (8th Cir. 1986). 
74 See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co. , 473 U.S. 479, 499 (1985); see also Sedima, 
S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 741 F.2d 482,487 (2d Cir. 1984). 
15 741 F.2d at 486, rev'd, 473 U .S. 479 (1985). 
76 See id.; see also Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., 553 F. Supp. 1347, 1361 (1983); 
RICO Cases Committee, A Compre"Mnsive Perspective on Ovil and Criminal RICO 
Legislalion and Uligalion, 1985 A.B.A. SEC. CRJM. Jusr. 8. 
77 632 F.2d 896, 903-04 (1st Cir. 1980), rev'd, 452 U.S. 576 (1981). 
78 ld. at 903. 
79 See id. at 904. 
80 See id.; Yellow Bus Lines, Inc. v. Drivers, c;pauffeurs & Helpers Local Union 639, 
913 F.2d 948, 955 (D.C. Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1222 (1991) (expressing 
concern that the broad interpretation of RICO may "work a major restructuring of our legal 
landscape"); see also Hokama v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 566 F. Supp. 636, 643-44 (C.D. Cal. 
1983). 
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limited RICO, only to be reversed by the Supreme Court.81 Turkette!2 was the 
first RICO case decided by the Court and would set the tone for the Court's 
later RICO cases. 
The First Circuit in Turkette held that a RICO enterprise encompassed only 
legitimate enterprises, not wholly illicit ones. 83 That holding found support in 
RICO's history84 and in § 1961(4) of the Act, which states that "enterprise" 
includes any partnership or corporation or any "other legal entity, "85 all of 
which are presumptively legitimate organizations. The First Circuit also 
supported its holding in Turkette by reference to concerns about federal-state 
relations and the almost boundless effect of reading RICO literally. 86 
The Supreme Court gave short shrift to the policy concerns expressed by 
the First Circuit in Turkette. The Court acknowledged that infiltration of 
legitimate organizations was RICO's primary but not exclusive goal.87 In 
reversing the First Circuit, the Court relied almost exclusively on RICO's 
broad language and found no support in the plain language of the statute to 
support a distinction between illegitimate and legitimate enterprises. 88 The 
Court found support in the legislative history that Congress considered and 
rejected concerns about intrusion into state criminal law enforcement areas. 89 
The Court did not address the additional concern about the boundless nature of 
81 See H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229 (1989) (holding that in 
order to prove a pattern of racketeering activity under RICO, a plaintiff or prosecutor must 
show at least two racketeering predicates that are related and that amount to, or threaten the 
likelihood of, continued criminal activity); Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479 
(1985) (holding that there was no support in the statute's history, language, or 
considerations of policy for a requirement that a private treble damages action could 
proceed only against a defendant who had already been criminally convicted. Thus, given 
the facts, Sedima's action was not barred. The Court also concluded that no "racketeering 
injury" is required.); Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16 (1983) (holding that interests 
subject to forfeiture under 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)(l) are not limited to interests in the 
enterprise and include "profits" and "proceeds"); United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576 
(1981) (holding that RICO "enterprise" applies to both legitimate and illegitimate 
organizations). 
82 452 u.s. at 576. 
83 See Turkette, 632 F.2d at 909. 
84 See id. at 901-02. 
85 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1984). In the most significant scholarly article examining 
RICO's history, Professor Lynch concluded, consistent with the First Circuit's holding in 
Turkette, that Congress intended to reach only legitimate organizations. Lynch, supra note 
2, at675-n. 
86 Turkette, 632 F.2d at 903. 
87 See United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 590 (1981). 
88 ld. at 590. 
89 ld. at 586. 
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RICO, other than to suggest in passing that RICO was intended "to 
eradicate . . . organized crime in America. "90 
1375 
Had the Court adopted the First Circuit's view, RICO would have been a 
minor device in the prosecutor's arsenal. However, by 1981, prosecutors had 
discovered that RICO was an effective crime fighting weapon against all kinds 
of defendants.91 RICO would have been severely limited because most RICO 
prosecutions involve wholly illegitimate or largely illegitimate associations of 
individuals. 92 That may explain but does not justify ignoring legislative history 
and other significant policy concerns raised by a broad reading of RICO. The 
Court's liberal construction of RICO also contributed to the proliferation of 
RICO actions. 
The idea that RICO may be limited to organized crime was short lived. In 
Sedima, the Second Circuit found that a civil RICO plaintiff could bring an 
action only after a defendant had been convicted on criminal charges and could 
recover only for a "racketeering injury. "93 The Second Circuit, in Sedima, had 
adopted the "racketeering injury" limitation to prevent RICO's "extraordinary, 
if not outrageous"94 uses and to bring its application in line with RICO's 
general purposes. The Supreme Court rejected the limitations imposed by the 
Second Circuit. 95 
The Court relied on RICO's literal language and broad remedial purposes. 
However, now it found that RICO was "an aggressive initiative to ... develop 
90 /d. at 589. Russello made a similar suggestion that RICO might be limited to 
organized crime. Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 24 (1983). However, as in 
Turkette, RusseUo gave a broad reading to the statutory term under consideration. /d. 
91 See Dennis, supra note 4, at 662; Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 
488 (1985). 
92 See G. Robert Blakey & Thomas A. Perry, An Analysis of the Myths tlult Bolster 
Efforts to Rewrite RICO and the Various Proposals for Reform: "Mother of God-Is This the 
End of RICO?", 43 VAND. L. REv. 851, 896 (1990). As overheard on a wiretap, one 
mobster explained the meaning of RICO to a cohort: "[l]f they don't prove that a legitimate 
business was infiltrated we're off the hook . .. • We can do anything we want. They can 
stick RICO •... I wouldn't be in a legitimate business for all the fuckin' money in the 
world to begin with." /d. at 869 n.12 (quoting G. O'NEILL & D. LEHR, THE UNO~: 
Tim RisE. AND FALL Of' A MAFIA FAMILY 233 (1989)). 
93 Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 741 F.2d 482, 492 (2d Cir. 1984), rev'd, 473 U.S. 
479 (1985). That limitation was not specifically rejected until H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell 
Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229 (1989). However, the Court's reasoning in Sedima made clear that 
such a limitation would fail. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 479. See infra notes 96-99 and 
accompanying text. 
94 Sedima, 741 F.2d at 499. 
95 Sedima, 473 U.S. at 481. 
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new methods for fighting crime," not necessarily organized crime. 96 The Court 
found few statements in the legislative history relating to this general goal of 
fighting crime, but the Court found this goal inherent in the "overall approach" 
of the statute and in statements made by RICO's opponents that it would be too 
easy a weapon against "innocent businessmen. "97 The evolution of RICO into 
something apart from its original intent was a function of the breadth of 
RICO's provisions. The earlier suggestion that RICO would be limited to 
organized crime disappeared after Sedima. 98 If RICO was being abused, relief 
would have to come from Congress, not the Court. 99 As in Turkette, the Court 
in Sedima gave short shrift to policy concerns that had troubled the lower 
federal court. 
The Court did suggest, however, that lower federal courts might limit 
RICO through the "pattern of racketeering" element. The Court observed 
specifically that the "'extraordinary' uses" to which plaintiffs had put civil 
RICO were a result of "the failure of Congress and the courts to develop a 
meaningful concept of 'pattern. '"100 The Eighth Circuit attempted to do just 
that. In Superior Oil Co. v. Fulmer, 101 the court found that "pattern" required 
more than one continuing criminal scheme and observed that "[i]t places a real 
strain on the language to speak of a single fraudulent effort, implemented by 
several fraudulent acts, as a 'pattern' of racketeering activity." 102 
The Supreme Court rejected that argument in H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern 
Bell Telephone Co.i03 The Court's starting point was the language of the Act. 
"Pattern," according to the Court, requires some relationship plus 
continuity.104 The Court relied on Title X of the Organized Crime Control Act 
for a definition of "relationship": "criminal acts that have the same or similar 
purposes, results, participants, victims, or methods of commission, or 
otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are not isolated 
events. "105 
96 /d. at 498. 
91 /d. 
98 See id. at 479. While the Court did not have to resolve whether RICO was limited to 
organized crime, much of its reasoning demonstrated that the argument would fiill. That 
proposed limitation was finally laid to rest in H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 
u.s. 229 (1989). 
99 See Sedima, 473 U.S. at 493. 
100 /d. at 500. 
101 785 F.2d 252, 258 (8th Cir. 1986). 
102Jd. at 257 (citing Northern Trust Bank/O'Hare, N.A. v. Inryco, Inc., 615 F. Supp. 
s2s, 832 (N.D. m. 1985)). 
103 492 u.s. 229 (1989). 
104 See id. at 237-39. 
lOS /d. at 240. 
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In discussing the continuity requirement, the Court rejected the Eighth 
Circuit's test of multiple schemes, though it stated that proof of multiple 
schemes would be "highly relevant. "106 The Court found the Eighth Circuit's 
approach too rigid and unsupported by RICO's legislative history. The Eighth 
Circuit, stated Justice Brennan, defined continuity "by introducing a concept-
the 'scheme' -that appears nowhere in the language or legislative history of the 
Act. "107 The Court also expressed doubts whether the "scheme" element 
would add certainty to an understanding of the "pattern" element.108 
Despite the Court's statement that RICO's legislative history lacked 
support for the Eighth Circuit's requirement of multiple "schemes," RICO's 
legislative history does support such a requirement. Senator McClellan and 
others in Congress insisted that RICO was inapplicable to sporadic criminal 
conduct.109 While a single scheme might involve multiple acts over a long 
period of time, Congress enacted RICO after consideration of the special evil 
represented by organized crime. Organized crime represented a threat to our 
national economic well-being because racketeers generated enormous illicit 
profits through widespread criminal activities and used economic power to 
develop monopoly power.110 Mafiosi made crime a way of life, perpetrating 
multiple criminal schemes.111 
Prior to Reves, the Supreme Court consistently rejected efforts by the 
lower federal courts to narrow RICO. Reliance on broad new statutory terms 
invited "creative" uses of RICO, however, the Court stated explicitly that 
reform had to come from Congress. 
IV. REVES V. ERNST & YOUNG 
Two of the Supreme Court's four RICO decisions produced sharp division 
within the Court. Sedima was decided by a 5-4 majority with a strong dissent 
106 /d. 
107 /d. at 241. 
108 See id. at 253. There is some irony in Justice Brennan's view that the single-
scheme concept would add confusion to the law. He has proposed a similar test in cases 
involving multiple prosecutions when the accused has claimed a violation of double 
jeopardy. See, e.g., Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 449 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring) 
(arguing that the Court should adopt a same transaction test for cases in which a defendant 
relies on collateral estoppel); Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508 (1990) (majority opinion 
authored by Brennan) (holding that a subsequent prosecution arising out of the "same 
conduct" as an earlier prosecution violated double jeopardy). 
109 See John L. McClellan, The Organized Crime Aa (S. 30) or Its Critics: Which 
Threatens Ovi/ Liberties?, 46 NOTREDAMEL. REv. 55, 62, 142-43 (1970). 
110 See supra notes 39-45. 
111 See supra notes 39-63. 
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by Justice Marshall. 112 While the result in H.J. Inc. was unanimous, it 
produced Justice Scalia's scathing concurring opinion in which he and three 
other justices suggested that RICO may be unconstitutionally vague.113 
By 1993, three of the dissenting justices in Sedima had retired from the 
Court. At least five sitting justices, however, had expressed grave misgiving 
about RICO.l14 H.J. Inc. may have been a wakeup call that the Court was 
concerned about the uncontrolled use of RIC0. 115 In Sedima, the Court had 
invited Congress to narrow RICO; Congress had failed to do so.l16 Important 
professional associations, including the American Bar Association, publicized 
concerns about RICO's breadth.11' Groups with widely different political 
agendas called for RICO's reform,l1B 
Finally, in 1993, the Court decided a case in which it adopted a lower 
federal court's narrowing interpretation of RICO's broad language. In Reves, 
112 Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Jmrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 500 (1985) (Marshall, Brennan, 
Blackmun & Powell, JJ., dissenting) (5-4 decision). 
113 H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co. , 492 U.S. 229 (1989) (9-0 decision). 
Despite the view of four justices, RICO would almost certainly withstand a vagueness 
challenge. See, e.g. , Joseph E. Bauerschmidt, Note, "Mother of Mercy-Is This The End of 
RICO?"~ustice Scalia Invites Constitutional Void-for-Vagueness Oudlenge to RICO 
"Pattern", 65 NorRB DAME L. REv. 1106 (1990); see also Frank C. Razzant, RICO 
Constitutionality: Multifactor Test Gets Top Marks, 1 NAT'L ITALIAN AM. BAR Assoc. J. 79 
(1991). Since H.J. Inc. , courts are virtually unanimous that RICO is not unconstitutionally 
vague./d. 
114 The five justices include the four justices concurring in H.J. Inc. and Justice 
Blackmun, who joined Justice Marshall's dissent in Sedimtl. See supra notes 112-13. 
115 The view that Reves represents a new concern with an overbroad interpretation of 
RICO may be undercut by the Court's decision the following term in NOW, Inc. v. 
Schiedler, 114 S. Ct. 798 (1994). In NOW, Inc., the Court rejected the Seventh Circuit's 
holding that a RICO enterprise had to have an economic motive. The result in Schiedler was 
unanimous and, as I have argued elsewhere, was an easy case in light of earlier Supreme 
Court decisions. Michael Vitiello, Has the Supreme Court Really Turned RICO Upside 
Down?: An Examination of NOW, Inc. v. Schiedler, 85 J. CRIM. LAw & CRlMINOLOGY 
1223 (1995). For example, Turkette was directly on point. In both cases, the litigant argued 
that the court should impose a requirement on the term "enterprise" not found in the 
statute's express language. As in Turkette, the Court in NOW, Inc. rejected that argument. 
See United States v. Turkette, 632 F.2d 896, 910 (1st Cir. 1980), rev'd, 452 U.S. 576 
(1981); NOW, Inc., 114 S. Ct. at 789. 
116 See supra notes 96-99. 
117 See RICO Cases Committee, supra note 76, at 9 (listing Department of Justice, the 
National Chamber of Commerce, and the Judicial Conference of the United States as 
supporters of RICO when introduced). 
118 See supra note 5. 
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plaintiff investors purchased notes of a fanners' cooperative.119 The defendant 
accounting firm was hired to audit the Co-op.12° The Co-op was in bad 
financial shape resulting from mismanagement and fraud of the Co-op's general 
manager and its accountant.121 The Co-op's solvency at the time of the audit 
was dependent on how the auditors valued a gasohol plant sold to the Co-op by 
its general manager.122 
The investors' claim against the accounting firm was based on the auditors' 
failure to tell the Co-op board of the Co-op's insolvency and on the auditors' 
misleading presentation at the Co-op board's 1982 and 1983 annual 
meetings.123 Although the plaintiffs prevailed at trial on state and federal 
securities fraud theories, the district court granted the defendant's motion for 
summary judgment on the RICO claim and dismissed it.124 
The complaint alleged a violation of § 1962(c), that the auditors 
"conducted or participated in the affairs of the Co-op, committing both mail 
fraud and securities fraud. "125 The district court relied on the Eighth Circuit's 
holding in Bennett v. Berg, 126 interpreting§ 1962(c) as requiring that the RICO 
defendant participate in the operation or management of the enterprise itself. 
The court of appeals affinned.127 The Supreme Court affinned the judgment of 
the Eighth Circuit. 128 
The Court began its analysis by explaining that § 1962(c) includes a 
repetition of the word "conduct," used both as a verb and as a noun. Section 
1962(c) states that it is "unlawful for any person employed by or associated 
with any enterprise ... to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the 
conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering. "129 In 
Reves, the auditors were associated with the enterprise and the Co-op, and 
participated in these affairs by preparing an audit and speaking at the annual 
meetings. The Court concluded that this was insufficient to bring the 
defendants within § 1962(c).1JO 
The verb "to conduct," according to the majority, means "to lead, run, 
119 Reves v. Ernst & Young, 113 S. Ct. 1163, 1168 (1993). See also Reves v. Ernst & 
Young, 937 F.2d 1310, 1315 (8th Cir. 1991). 
120 Reves, 113 S. Ct. at 1168. 
121 /d. at 1166-67. 
122Jd. at 1167; Reves, 931 F.2d at 1317. 
123 Reves, 113 S. Ct. at 1167-68 (discussing liability based on failure to act). 
124 /d. at 1168. 
125 Reves, 931 F.2d at 1323. 
126 710 F.2d 1361 (8th Cir. 1983) (en bane), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1008 (1984). 
127 Reves, 931 F.2d at 1324. 
128 Reves, 113 S. Ct. at 1174. 
129 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1988). 
130 Reves, 113 S. Ct. at 1173. 
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manage, or direct," and thus "indicates some degree of direction. "131 
Accordingly, § 1962(c) could not be read to mean only that an actor violated 
the section by participating in the affairs of the enterprise because that would 
render superfluous the noun "conduct. "132 If mere participation was intended 
to be enough, Congress would have made it unlawful to participate in the 
affairs of an enterprise, not to participate in the conduct of its affairs.133 Hence, 
when used as a noun as well, "'conduct• . . . include[s] an element of 
direction. " 134 
The Court also had to define the meaning of "participate." That term might 
mean nothing more than to render some assistance or to aid and abet, not 
requiring any management or control over the affairs of the enterprise. Instead, 
when read in context, one has to participate in the conduct of the affairs. But 
that is something less than a requirement that one conduct the affairs of the 
enterprise. When read along with the phrase, "directly or indirectly," it was 
clear to the Court "that RICO liability is not limited to those with a formal 
position in the enterprise, but some part in directing the enterprise's affairs is 
required. "135 According to the majority, the "operation or management" test 
describes § 1962(c)'s meaning and "is easy to apply. "136 
V. ANALYSIS OF REVES 
Reves has produced confusion among lower federal courts. 137 What 
compounds the post-Reves confusion is the Supreme Court's analysis of its own 
test in relation to the facts of the case, a case involving omission liability under 
the securities laws. The Court decided an unusually narrow case in which its 
test was easily met.138 But the Court left unresolved a number of significant 
questions, suggesting that its test is not easily applied, a conclusion supported 
by post-Reves litigation.139 
The Reves Court's analysis of the convoluted statutory language produced 
widely different interpretations among lower federal courts. Furthermore, the 
Court refused to apply its test to difficult facts, inviting litigation in the wake of 
/d. 




135 /d. at 1170 (footnote omitted). 
136 /d. The Court found additional support in the legislative history for its conclusion. 
137 See infra notes 190-281 and accompanying text. 
138 See infra notes 147-51 and accompanying text. 
139 See infra notes 190-281 and accompanying text. 
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its decision. But Reves is dissatisfying for an additional reason. In light of 
public criticism of RICO and efforts at legislative reform,140 the Court must 
have been aware of significant policy questions implicated in Reves. But even 
judged by its own unwillingness to address policy issues in its prior RICO 
cases, Reves is singularly unilluminating on those issues. 
That Reves is the first decision upholding a narrow construction of RICO's 
broad language may signal that the Court is troubled by issues raised by lower 
federal courts,14t the ABA,142 and other prominent critics of RIC0.143 Given 
its position in cases like Sedima, the Court may have failed to articulate its 
views on those policy questions because in cases prior to Reves the Court left 
itself little maneuvering room. The Court has been loathe to overrule precedent 
in statutory construction cases.144 Addressing the underlying policy concerns in 
Reves may have demonstrated that the Court now disagrees with its own 
holding in Sedima or at least with its unwillingness to limit RICO consistently 
with the policy concerns expressed by the Second Circuit.145 But Reves was a 
blueprint for confusion because of its narrow holding, its refusal to address a 
number of more complicated questions raised but not resolved by its decision, 
and its total silence on its view of the policy questions implicated in Reves .146 
A. Reves as an Omission-Liability Case 
After construing the "plain meaning" of§ 1962(c), Reves applied its own 
test to the facts before it. The Court found that the only basis for a finding that 
the auditors "participated" would have been in their failure to tell the board 
that the plant should have been valued differently .147 That failure did not 
140 See supra noteS. 
141 See supra part m. 
142 See RICO Cases Committee, supra note 76, at 9. 
143 See supra note 5. 
144 See, e.g., Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989); Erie R.R. v. 
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 74-78 (1938). This is not a rule without exception. See, e.g., 
Hubbard v. United States, 115 S. Ct. 1754 (1994). 
145 The Second Circuit was concerned about "outrageous" uses of RICO and the 
federalization of wide areas of common law fraud. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 741 
F.2d 482, 487 (2d Cir. 1984), rev'd, 473 U.S. 479 (1985). By analogy, in Reves, the Court 
may have been concerned about routinely converting securities fraud cases into RICO 
actions, thereby altering the existing technical scheme of securities laws without clear 
evidence that Congress intended to alter the securities Jaws when it enacted RICO. Similar 
arguments were unavailing in Sedima. In the interim, Congress had been unable to reform 
RICO. 
146 See infra text accompanying notes 152-89. 
147 Reves v. Ernst & Young, 113 S. Ct. 1163, 1174 (1993). 
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amount to the operation or management of the Co-op's affairs. The Court 
rejected the dissent's argument that the auditors exercised management or 
control by preparing the financial statement, a responsibility considered to be 
managerial in nature.148 Thus, Reves may be read simply as a case of a 
culpable omission. On that reading, one who fails to act cannot be said to 
.. participate in the conduct of the affairs" of the relevant enterprise. 149 
Had the auditors prepared the misleading summaries or had the plaintiffs' 
claim for relief relied on misleading statements made by a representative of the 
accounting firm (rather than a failure to disclose information), or had a 
representative of the accounting firm made misleading statements at the board 
meeting, the Court may have found sufficient participation in the conduct of the 
Co-op's affairs. This view is supported by the Supreme Court's statements that 
professional standards permit accountants to rely on information given them by 
their clients and that the audit report did reveal the basis upon which the 
gasohol plant had been evaluated. ISO As characterized by the Court, Reves is 
not a case in which the auditors affirmatively deceived the public; instead, their 
culpability was based on their failure to correct misleading information 
prepared by others. lSI 
B. Reves and Unstated Policy Concerns 
In Sedima, the Second Circuit was concerned that without limitations 
imposed, RICO would convert garden variety common law fraud into a federal 
right of action with stepped up damages and attorneys' fees available to 
148 ld. at 1167. 
149 Support for this narrow view of Reves is found in the Eighth Circuit's discussion of 
auditors' liability under federal securities laws. Reves v. Ernst & Young, 937 F.2d 1310, 
1314 (8th Cir. 1991). The parties treated the basis of auditors' liability under Rule 10b-5 as 
omiMion liability. SEC Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1994). Liability under Rule 
10b-5 turned on the finding that auditors' had a duty to disclose to the investors that the 
financial summaries prepared by the Co-<>p were misleading. Reves, 937 F.2d at 1329-30. 
The financial reports prepared by the auditors did include a discussion of how the auditors 
determined the valuation of the gasohol plant. ld. at 1317-18. The Court did not explicitly 
limit Revu to cases involving omission liability. I have argued in this Article that such a 
limitation is implicit in part of the Court's analysis. Because the limitation was implicit, the 
Court did not address why RICO might not extend liability to omiMions whereas the 
criminal law typically does so. q: United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1975) (holding that 
§ 301(K) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act creates liability for a failure to 
ensure against violations of the Act). 
ISO Revu, 113 S. Ct. at 1173-74. 
lSI ld. 
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successful plaintiffs. 152 The Supreme Court found that concern unavailing and 
concluded, instead, that any change must come from Congress. 153 
Despite considerable pressure to reform RICO after SediJtul,lS4 Congress 
has not acted.ISS RICO has produced extraordinary political alignments.IS6 
RICO's equal availability to criminal and civil defendants may explain the 
alliance of liberal groups urging RICO's reform like the ACLU aligning with 
pro-business groups like the National Association of Manufacturers and the 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants. The wide array of political 
interests aligned on both sides of the debate may explain Congress • inability to 
reform RICO. With Congress suffering gridlock, pressure on the Supreme 
Court to limit RICO may have mounted. 
Reves posed some of the same concerns present in Sedinul. Reves was 
another decision in which professionals were drawn into civil litigation because 
the primary perpetrator of a fraudulent scheme was judgment proof.IS7 It was 
another case in which RICO was used to treble damages even though no similar 
damages would have been available for the underlying fraud. 158 In cases like 
Sedima and Reves, plaintiffs have relied on securities, mail or wire fraud as the 
underlying predicate offenses to turn the professionals' conduct into a federal 
right of action.159 Mail fraud is actionable only when it is part of a RICO 
"pattern of racketeering. "160 Securities fraud, even if actionable, provides more 
limited damages than a RICO violation.l61 
In a related context, the District of Columbia Circuit adopted the 
"significant control" test.l62 In Yellow Bus Lines, Inc. v. Drivers, Chauffeurs 
&: Helpers Local Union 639, the court limited RICO because "[a] broader 
1S2 Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 741 F.2d 482, 503 (2d Cir. 1984), rev'd, 473 
u.s. 479 (1985). 
153 Sedima, 473 u.s. at 499. 
154 See, e.g., Susan Getzendanner, "Judicial Pruning" of "Garden Variety Fraud" 
QviJ RICO Cases Does Not Work: It's Tune for umgress to Act, 43 VAND. L. REv. 673, 
678 (1990) (for one example of criticism of RICO). 
ISS See Hughes, supra note 5, at 642-46 (discussing the failure of RICO reform). 
156 See supra note 5. 
157 Ralph A. Pitts et al., Ovi/ RICO and Professional Liability after Reves: PlainJi.ffs 
Will Have to Look ~re to Reach the "Deep Pockets" of Outside Professioflllls (Part 1 
of2), CN. RICO REP., Oct. 13, 1993, at 1. 
158 The Supreme Court had already ruled that the notes were securities within the 
meaning of 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10). Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 71 (1990). 
159 Getzendanner, supra note 154, at 678-79. 
160 /d. at 676. 
161 See 15 U.S.C.S. § 78r (1983) (liability for misleading statements). 
162 Yellow Bus lines, Inc. v. Drivers, Chauffeurs & Helpers Local Union 639, 913 
F.2d 948, 954 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
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reading of section 1962(c) would ... work a major restructuring of our legal 
landscape. "163 In Yellow Bus Lines, the plaintiff sued the defendant union and 
its business agent and trustee. The plaintiff attempted to state a § 1962(c) claim 
against the union based on events surrounding a strike for union recognition. 164 
The narrow test was warranted, according to the court, because to hold 
otherwise would upset the balance that Congress had struck in its extensive 
legislation in labor-management relations.16S 
Judge Milcva concurred in the en bane decision. 166 But he raised the point, 
alluded to above, that in light of cases like Sedima, it may be too late to limit 
RICO to avoid conflict with other areas of the law. Just as a contrary holding 
in Yellow Bus Lines, would '"RICOize'" labor law, "Sedima has already 
federalized many aspects of state fraud law. "167 That is, Judge Milcva doubted 
that principled lines could be drawn to prevent RICO from spilling over into 
other specialized areas of the law. Sedima had rejected such an effort by the 
Second Circuit.l68 
Cases like Reves have the effect of "RICOizing" federal securities law, 169 
while cases like Sedima have the effect of "RICOizing" and federalizing state 
fraud claims in cases in which the use of the mails converts local fraud into 
mail fraud, which in tum becomes actionable in civil cases only through 
RICO.l7° Unless the Court was willing to undercut the reasoning in Sedima, 
the Court could not state its concern in Reves about using RICO in securities 
fraud cases, an area in which Congress has already heavily legislated.l71 
Litigation in fraud cases also presents troubling proof problems. For 
example, in some cases, accountants or lawyers may be charged with mail 
fraud based on dissemination of misinformation through the mails.172 But the 
lawyer, accountant or other professional may have been negligent, rather than 
willful, in preparing a document. For example, in a number of cases, 
professionals have been charged with fraud based on touting a tax shelter 
eventually disallowed by the IRS.l73 But the representation that the tax shelter 
was sound may have been based on ignorance or bad judgment rather than on 
163 /d. at 955. 
164 ld. at 950. 
165 /d. at 955. 
166 Id. at 956 (Mikva, J., concurring). 
167 Id. at 957 (Mikva, J. , concurring). 
168 Sedima, S.P.R.L. v . Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 481 (1985). 
169 See Crovitz, supra note 6, at 1058-59. 
170 See Getzendanner, supra note 154, at 680-81. 
171 See Semma, 473 U.S. at 504-05 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
172 See, e.g., Sassoon v. Altgelt, m, Inc. , 822 F. Supp. 1303 (N.D. lll. 1993). 
173 See, e.g., Nolte v. Pearson, 994 F.2d 1311 (8th Cir. 1993). 
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an intent to defraud. Negligence or malpractice is not mail fraud because there 
is no intent to defraud.l74 But the mens rea of mail fraud may not be sufficient 
protection for those accused of fraudulent conduct because of the way in which 
a prosecuting party proves fraudulent intent. 17S 
In a fraud case, the plaintiff will seldom have a "smoking gun" on the 
intent to defraud. Few defendants will admit that they acted consciously to 
deceive the victim of the fraud. 176 Instead, the mental element will be proven 
inferentially from facts known to the defendant. The fact finder will then be 
invited to infer what the defendant must have known.l77 Hence, the bungling 
professional who should have known that an asset was overvalued is hard to 
distinguish from one who, the jury may believe, had actual knowledge.178 
From the jury's perspective, the difference between fraud and malpractice may 
not seem particularly significant: in both cases, the victim is equally harmed. 
Given the limited ability to take a case away from the jury, 179 the trial court 
174 18 U.S.C. § 1341 is explicit that a defendant must have an intent to defraud. See 
Lustiger v. United States, 386 F.2d 132 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. deniM, 390 U.S. 951 (1968); 
cf. Durland v. United States, 161 U.S. 306, 313 (1896) (identifying the significant fact as 
intent and purpose). See generally 2 KATHLEEN F. BRICKEY, CORPORATE CRIMINAL 
I.JABn..rrY, § 8:51 (2d ed. Clark Boardman Callaghan, 1992). 
17S See Blakey et at., supra note 4, at 1082. 
176 That would appear obvious in cases reviewed in this discussion. Were the 
defendant to admit the fraud, plaintiff would almost certainly be able to move for partial 
summary judgment on the question of liability. q. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 
U.S. 322 (1979) (upholding motion for partial summary judgment proper because issue of 
defendant's false and misleading proxy statement was collaterally estopped). 
177 See United States v. Andrade, 788 F.2d 521, 526 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 
963 (1986); United States v. Fuel, 583 F.2d 978, 983 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 
U.S. 1127 (1979); United States v. Nance, 502 F.2d 615, 618 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 
420 U.S. 926 (1975); United States v. Seasholtz, 435 F.2d 4, 8 (lOth Cir. 1970). Further, a 
number of cases have allowed either a willful blindness or reckless disregard charge. See 
United States v. Kaplan, 832 F.2d 676, 682 (1st Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 907 
(1988); United States v. Dick, 744 F.2d 546, 551 (7th Cir. 1984); United States v. Massa, 
740 F.2d 629, 643 (8th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1115 (1985); United States v. 
Schaflander, 719 F.2d 1024, 1027 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1216 (1984). 
Willful blindness may allow an inference of actual knowledge. See United States v. Jewel, 
532 F.2d 697 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 951 (1976); see also BRICKEY, supra note 
174, at§ 8:51. 
178 In some cases, federal courts, while purporting to require knowledge, assume that 
knowledge is satisfied if a defendant should have known a fact, hence, treating the objective 
negligence standard as the equivalent of the subjective requirement of knowledge. See, e.g., 
United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d 662, 664--65 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. 
denied, 469 u.s. 1208 (1985). 
179 Because of concerns that use of the directed verdict or judgment notwithstanding 
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will be able to provide the bungling professional with little protection from a 
finding that he or she committed fraud. That is, the case would be ripe for 
neither a summary judgment nor a judgment as a matter of law. RICO's treble 
damages and attorneys' fees provisions, however, are not appropriate for 
negligent actors. 
A related policy consideration in Reves is the apportionment of damages. 
Typical of our system is that defendants who are jointly and severally liable 
pay the entire damages if their cohorts are judgment proof.180 That rule has 
been targeted by proponents of tort reform because it can produce great 
injustice.181 For example, deep-pocket corporate defendants have often 
complained that they are left holding the bag for conduct in which their fault is 
minor and a more culpable joint tortfeasor is insolvent.182 The result is that the 
solvent defendant pays damages grossly out of proportion with his or her 
degree of fault. The problem is especially acute in RICO cases because the 
disproportionality between damages and the defendant's fault is magnified 
when the damages are trebled. 
Had Reves reversed the decision of the lower court, a jury may have found 
the auditors' liable in such a case. The Co-op had been run aground by two 
men found guilty of.tax fraud;183 the general manager of the Co-op appears to 
have drained four million dollars from the Co-op.184 By comparison, the 
auditors may have bungled, but their fault hardly rises to the level of the 
general manager's self-dealing. The auditors, however, would be liable for the 
entire amount of the judgment, absent other solvent defendants.18S 
The Court's assertion in Reves that the plain language of § 1962(c) was 
dispositive meant that the Court did not have to articulate underlying policy 
considerations. But the language was not plain186 and despite the Court's 
confidence that its management or control test was easily applied, Reves has 
the verdict may violate the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial, federal courts must 
view the evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See, e.g., Lavender v. 
Kum, 327 U.S. 645 (1946); Rogers v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 500 (1957). 
180 See REsTATEMENT {SECOND) OF TORTS § 875 {1979). 
181 See id. at§ 886B (1979) (An inferential step may support the proposition, but the 
Restatement does not mention tort reform.). 
182 See Jay K. Wright, Why Are ProfessioMls Wonied About RICO?, 65 NOTRE DAME 
L. REv. 983, 992-95 (1990). 
183 Reves v. Ernst & Young, 113 S. Ct. 1163, 1167 (1993). 
184/d. 
185 See, e.g., Fleischhauer v. Feltner, 879 F.2d 1290, 1301 (6th Cir. 1989) (holding 
that the nature of RICO offenses requires joint and severable liability), ce11. denied, 493 
U.S. 1074 (1990); United States v. Wilson, 742 F. Supp. 905, 909 (E.D. Pa. 1989) 
(holding that joint and severable liability is consistent with RICO). 
186 See supra note 14. 
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proved unworkable. Lower courts are in disarray .187 The Court's analysis in 
Reves focused on the peculiar facts of the case without explaining whether the 
Court's holding was limited to cases involving omission liability under the 
securities laws. 
Reves has already generated considerable litigation, especially in cases 
involving professional defendants188 whose professional associations have been 
active in lobbying for legislative reform.189 Much of the confusion spawned by 
Reves is a result of the Court's failure to confront hard policy questions that 
were present in the case. 
VI. REVES IN THE COURTS 
For those eager to see RICO narrowed, Reves is a welcome change}90 
Indeed, many federal courts have found in Reves a broad invitation to limit 
RICO. But as argued below, PlaDY courts have demonstrated more hostility to 
RICO than fidelity to Reves. Two lines of cases are especially troubling: one 
line of cases has found in Reves a general immunity for outsiders who are 
providers of professional services;191 the second line has found in Reves a 
requirement that a § 1962(c) defendant must have responsibility for directing 
another person. 192 
A. Providers of Professional Services 
In what may become a significant legal trend, 193 a number of courts have 
187 See infra text accompanying notes 194-281. 
188 See, e.g., Azridli v. Cohen Law Offices, 21 F.Jd 512 (2d Cir. 1994); Napoli v. 
United States, 32 F.3d 31 (2d Cir. 1994); Stone v. Kirk, 8 F.3d 1079 (6th Cir. 1993); 
Baumer v. Pachl, 8 F.3d 1341 (9th Cir. 1993); University of Maryland v. Peat Marwick 
Main & Co., 923 F.2d 265 (3d Cir. 1991); Sassoon v. Altgelt, m, Inc., 822 F. Supp. 
1303 (N.D. ill. 1993); Morin v. Trupin, 832 F. Supp. 93 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); Gilmore v. 
Berg, 820 F. Supp. 179 (D.N.J. 1993); United States v. Altman, 820 F. Supp. 794 
(S.D.N.Y. 1993); In re Crazy Eddie Securities Litigation, 824 F. Supp. 320 (E.D.N.Y. 
1993). 
189 See Wright, supra note 182, at 984. 
190 See supra text accompanying notes 81-111 (discussing the fact that Reves is the 
first case in which the Supreme Court bas affirmed the lower federal court's decision in 
which it limited RICO). 
191 See infra text accompanying notes 193-251. 
192 See infra text accompanying notes 252-81. 
193 Ralph A. Pitts et al., Qvil RICO and Professional Liability After Reves: PlainJiffs 
WUJ Have to Look Elsewhere to Reach the "Deep Pockets" of Outside Professionals (Part 2 
of2), CN. RICO REP., Oct. 20, 1993, at 1. 
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found in Reves support for the proposition that providers of professional 
services who can otherwise be characterized as outsiders are beyond the scope 
of§ 1962(c). The following cases illustrate this trend. 
In Baumer v. Pachl, plaintiffs were investors in a California limited 
partnership}94 Emery Erdy and his corporation, Estate Planning Associates, 
Inc. (EPA), the organizers of the partnership, were ordered by the California 
Department of Corporations to desist public sale of partnership interests 
because the transactions amounted to the illegal sale of unregistered 
securities.19S Plaintiffs did not sue EPA or Erdy because EPA and Erdy, were 
already in bankruptcy proceedings.196 
Instead, the investors sued the attorney who provided EPA and Erdy with 
legal services and they sued a licensed real estate appraiser who appraised the 
property in which the plaintiffs had invested.197 The plaintiffs' RICO claim 
against the attorney was based on his representation of EPA and Erdy before 
the state agency. Plaintiffs alleged that the attorney attempted to cover up EPA 
and Erdy's fraud by mischaracterizing their conduct in correspondence with the 
state. Furthermore, the plaintiffs alleged that the attorney made false 
representations in correspondences to the limited partners.I98 While the 
attorney was representing EPA and Erdy in bankruptcy, he allegedly 
misrepresented to the limited partners the status of EPA and Erdy's assets in an 
effort to discourage legal actions against them.199 
The trial court, relying on H.J. Inc., dismissed the claim against the 
attorney because the court found that the plaintiffs' § 1962(c) claim failed to 
allege a "pattern of racketeering. "200 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the judgment 
of the district court but did so in reliance on Reves, rather than on H.J. Inc. 2o1 
The Ninth Circuit characterized the complained of conduct in Reves as 
"Ernst & Young's preparation of the audit reports, meetings with the Board of 
Directors to explain the audits, and presentations at the annual meetings. "202 
The court analogized the attorney's conduct to that of Ernst & Young: the 
attorney held no formal position in the organization, his involvement began 
several years after the fraudulent scheme began, and his role was sporadic.2°3 
194 8 F.Jd 1341, 1342 (9th Cir. 1993). 
I9S Id. at 1342. 
196 /d. at 1342 n.l. 
197 /d. at 1343. 
198 /d. at 1342. 
199 /d. at 1343. 
200 /d. 
201 /d. at 1344. 
202/d. 
203 /d. 
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The court described the attorney's role as "limited to providing legal services 
to the limited partnership and EPA. "204 Reves held, according to the Ninth 
Circuit, that whether legal services are rendered "well or poorly, properly or 
improperly, is irrelevant to the Reves test. "205 Baumer appears to adopt the 
general rule that an attorney who is providing legal services does not violate § 
1962(c).206 
In Sassoon v. Altgelt, m, Inc., the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant law 
finn "drafted [a limited partnership] Offering which contained the promise that 
investors['] funds would be returned to them if either of two contingencies 
were not met. "2°7 The complaint also alleged additional fraudulent acts 
sufficient to support a common law fraud claim for misrepresentation. 208 
Despite that, the court dismissed the RICO claim because the law firm's 
"conduct consisted of providing legal services to the general partners and to the 
limited partnership. "209 According to the district court, a defendant cannot be 
found liable under § 1962(c) merely for providing legal services.210 
A final example demonstrates the willingness of courts to use Reves to 
exempt professionals from liability under § 1962(c). In Biofeedtrac, Inc. v. 
Kolirwr Optical Enterprises &: Consultants, S.R.L., plaintiff's principal, Dr. 
Joseph Trachtman, granted defendant George Jordan's company, Kolinor, 
distribution rights for Biofeedtrac's vision training device.211 
Biofeedtrac's complaint alleged that multiple defendants, including 
Kolinor, used plaintiff's trade secrets to attempt to manufacture and market a 
competing vision device. It further alleged that the defendants concealed the 
scheme through multiple acts of mail and wire fraud.212 
Plaintiff named Christopher Kuehn, an attorney who had left a New York 
law firm to start his own practice with Kolinor as his only client, as a 
defendant. According to the complaint, Kuehn represented Kolinor in its 
attempt to manufacture its own optical device and informed Jordan of the legal 
risks involved in his project. But Plaintiff alleges that Kuehn went beyond 
giving what one might reasonably characterize as legal advice when he offered 
to create the appearance during negotiations with Biofeedtrac that Kolinor was 








211 832 F. Supp. 585, 587 (E.D.N.Y. 1993). 
212Jd. 
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manufacture the competing device. "213 
During this time, Jordan provided technicians with Biofeedtrac's device so 
that they could dismantle it in order to develop their own device. Kuehn was 
aware of this work and that this device would infringe Biofeedtrac's patents.214 
To facilitate the project, Kuehn incorporated two companies, named himself to 
the companies • boards, and offered to serve as counsel to the two 
companies.21S 
Biofeedtrac filed its action in April 1990, naming several defendants, and 
claiming, inter alia, that the defendants violated § 1962(c). Kolinor was named 
as the enterprise.216 According to Biofeedtrac, prior to a hearing in early May 
for injunctive relief, Kuehn advised a witness to commit perjury.217 The court 
summarized Kuehn's involvement as follows: Kuehn knew about the fraudulent 
scheme to manufacture the vision device; he "advised Jordan how to avoid 
detection and to minimize the legal risks of such a scheme . . . performed 
ministerial legal tasks in advancing the project, and advised one participant that 
he could mislead this court. "218 
The district court dismissed the claim against Kuehn based on its reading of 
Reves. The court characterized the issue of the case as whether RICO imposes 
liability "on an attorney who provides legal advice and legal services to clients, 
intending the advice and services to advance the clients' scheme to defraud. "219 
The court supported its holding by adopting Justice Souter's characterization of 
the accountants • role in his Reves dissent. 220 Justice Souter argued that the 
accountants took on a management responsibility by creating the records that 
they then audited, an act that took them beyond the role of independent 
accountants. 221 According to the district court, "the Court held, by its silence, 
that even when professionals go beyond their customary role," they will not be 
deemed to have participated in the "operation or management of the enterprise 
itself. "222 
Conceding that Kuehn was "more intimately connected to the operation of 
the alleged enterprise here than the professionals in Reves, "223 the court found 




217 /d. at 588-89. 
218 /d. at 589. 
219 /d. at 590. 
220 /d. at 591. 
221 Reves v. Ernst & Young, 113 S. Ct. 1163, 1176 (1993) (Souter, J., dissenting). 
222 Biofeedtrac, Inc., v. Kolinor Optical Enters. & Consultants, S.R.L. , 832 F. Supp. 
585, 591 (1993). 
223Jd. 
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that his conduct was confined to giving legal advice and providing legal 
services. By comparison, he did not participate in the decision to manufacture 
the infringing device or offer business (as opposed to legal) advice.224 His 
compensation was limited to fees for legal services. The court dismissed as 
within the ordinary role of corporate counsel Kuehn's position as the sole 
director and officer for one of the companies that he incorporatecJ.225 
The three cases discussed above are factually distinguishable from Reves 
and extend Reves to unintended territory. While Baumer and Sassoon involved 
allegations that an attorney actively misrepresented client conduct in order to 
cover up the client's fraudulent scheme, Biofeedtrac goes even further. Like the 
plaintiffs in Baumer and Sassoon, the plaintiff in Biofeedtrac alleged that the 
attorney actively misrepresented facts.226 Beyond that, the plaintiff in 
Biofeedtrac alleged that Kuehn acted as a corporate officer, a role often served 
by corporate counsel, but not necessarily a position reserved for lawyers. 227 
Most damning, however, was the fact that Kuehn allegedly suborned perjury or 
attempted to obstruct justice in his efforts to get a witness to mislead the 
court.22s 
Unlike Reves, in which the accountants' "failure to tell the Co-op's 
board"229 was insufficient to create liability, in Baumer, Sassoon, and 
Biofeedtrac the lawyers engaged in active conduct in violation of RICO's 
predicate offenses. While a professional may not manage, operate, conduct or 
participate by inaction, no similar problem arises if one takes affirmative 
actions.230 
Even if Reves is not limited to its facts, cases like Baumer, Sassoon and 
BiofeedJrac go too far. These cases have created a bright-line rule for outsider-
professionals who provide services to the enterprise. Reves specifically rejected 
such an easy distinction between insiders and outsiders. The Reves Court 
recognized that some outsiders may be said to operate or manage the affairs of 
the enterprise. 231 
Creating an exemption for professionals sets up a questionable double 
standard. Cases like Biofeedtrac give professionals a blanket immunity even 
224 /d. 
225 /d. 
226 /d. at 587. For example, urging a witness to commit perjury is arguably not even 
giving legal advice. The relevant statute is 18 U.S.C. § 1622 (1988) (subornation of 
perjury). 
227 Biofoedtrac, Inc. , 832 F. Supp. at 591. 
228 /d. at 588-89. 
229 Reves v. Ernst & Young, 113 S. Ct. 1163, 1173-74 (1993). 
230 See supra text accompanying notes 147-51. 
2Jl D-
IU<vt!S, 113 s. Ct. at 1173. 
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when their conduct violates provisions of § 1962(c).232 By contrast, no 
immunity exists for a Mafioso or a business person who commits the same 
acts. For example, in Sassoon, if a nonlawyer business person sent out the 
same allegedly fraudulent letters, that person would be liable under § 1962(c) 
while the lawyer would be exempt even if he or she committed the requisite 
predicate offenses and engaged in sufficient acts to meet the "pattern" 
requirement as defined in H.J. Inc. 233 
A court might believe a broad exemption for lawyers is justified by a need 
to allow the attorney to represent his or her client zealously without fear of 
reprisals for that representation. 234 Reves may have been concerned about 
converting professional misconduct into criminal conduct. 235 But such a policy 
argument has failed in other contexts. For example, cases have held that an 
attorney advising his or her client to plead the Fifth Amendment may be guilty 
of a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1503 if the prosecutor can prove the requisite 
corrupt intent. 236 This intent may be established when the attorney advises his 
or her client not to testify in order to protect a third party, rather than to protect 
232 In some more recent cases, courts have taken a different approach to the problem. 
For example, in Napoli v. United Smus, the Second Circuit found that the lawyer-
defendants conducted the affairs of the law firm through a pattern of racketeering. 32 F .3d 
31, 37 (2d. Cir. 1994). Napoli suggests that the result in cases like Baumer, Biofeedlrac, 
and Sassoon might be avoided by plaintiffs if plaintiffs plead a different enterprise, 
specifically, the law firm. See Tribune Co. v. Purcigliotti, 869 F. Supp. 1076 (S.D.N.Y. 
1994) (m which professionals, including members of a law firm, were alleged to have 
participated in an association-in-filet, consisting of various entities). By implication, 
Purcigliotti suggests that the result in cases like Baumer might have been different if the 
plaintiffs had alleged a different enterprise, an association-in-filet, in which case the lawyers' 
conduct may have met Reves' operation or management test. 
233 H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 236-41 (1989). 
234 In the cases reviewed, defendants other than the providers of professional services 
remain liable for the same conduct. See Morin v. Trupin, 832 F. Supp. 93 (S.D.N.Y. 
1993); Biofeedtrac, Inc. v. Kolinor Optical Enters. & Consultants, S.R.L., 832 F. Supp. 
585 (1993). 
23S That rationale may sometimes motivate judicial line drawing. See, e.g., Morgan v. 
United States, 309 F.2d 234 (D.C. Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 917 (1963) (drawing 
a distinction between false statements to the court in its administrative as opposed to judicial 
capacity for purposes of criminal liability under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 to avoid criminalizing 
trial tactics). But see United States v. Cintolo, 818 F.2d 980 (1st Cir.) (rejecting a lawyer's 
claim for a special defense to a charge under 18 U.S.C. § 1503 (obstructing justice) and 
finding that evenhanded justice requires that lawyers be held to the same standard of 
conduct as other defendants), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 913 (1987). 
236 Ontolo, 818 F.2d at 990. But see United States v. Herron, 28 F.2d 122 (N.D. Cal. 
1928). 
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the attorney's client.237 
A broad exemption for professionals also flies in the face of congressional 
history. As developed above, the Katzenbach Commission identified the 
Mafia's modus operandi as including the use of accountants and other 
professionals to manage their resources and the use of lawyers to help corrupt 
the judicial system.238 The Commission recognized that the Mafia could not 
function alone on muscle and murder, but had become truly dangerous because 
it had discovered how to gain an appearance of legitimacy by relying on the 
technical expertise of professionals. 239 
Hence, the court in Biofeedtrac missed the point when it stated that the 
lawyer did not manufacture or decide to manufacture the competing vision 
device. 240 For example, the Katzenbach Commission described the Mafia as 
characterized by its structure and division of labor with some soldiers 
performing intimidation and violence and others finding investments to launder 
mob money and still other family members bribing politicians and judges.241 If 
the allegations in Biojeedtrac were true, the lawyer acted as a consiglieri, a role 
within the Mafia's hierarchical structure, occupied by an individual who enjoys 
power and influence through the advice he gives other Mafia leaders.242 
Most of the decisions granting immunity to lawyers have dealt with outside 
counsel, not corporate counseJ.243 Were corporate counsel to prepare 
fraudulent documents in furtherance of the enterprise's business, most courts 
would not exempt that lawyer. Corporate counsel would most likely be held 
liable because, as the Reves' decision suggests, a case against outsiders is more 
difficult to prove than one against a person within the enterprise.244 Thus, if 
the allegedly fraudulent correspondence in Sassoon was prepared by corporate 
counsel, the attorneys who prepared the correspondence would apparently not 
come within the exemption articulated by the Reves court. Likewise if 
corporate counsel obstructed justice by regularly destroying corporate 
documents, the fact that the attorneys' conduct may relate to rendering services 
237 0111olo, 818 F.2d at 992-93. 
238 See supra text accompanying notes 41-46. 
239 See TASK FORCE REPoRT, supra note 31, at 4. 
240 Biofeedtrac, Inc. v. Kolinor Optical Enters. & Consultants, S.R.L., 832 F . Supp. 
585, 591 (1993). 
241 See TASKFORCE REPoRT, supra note 31, at 8. 
242Jd. at 7. 
243 See, e.g., Baumer v. Pachl, 8 F.3d 1341 (9th Cir. 1993); Gilmore v. Berg, 820 F. 
Supp. 179 (D.N.J. 1993); Morin v. Trupin, 832 F. Supp. 93 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); Sassoon v. 
Algelt, 822 F. Supp. 1303 (N.D. D1. 1993); United States v. Altman, 820 F. Supp. 794 
(S.D.N.Y. 1993). 
244 See, e.g., Sassoon, 822 F. Supp. at 1303. But see Biofeedtrac, Inc. , 832 F. Supp. 
at 591 (extending protection to an attorney who served as corporate counsel). 
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as lawyers would appear to be irrelevant as to whether they violated§ 1962(c}. 
Liability would be unquestionable. 
A number of differences may exist between corporate counsel and outside 
counsel relating to, for example, whether the attorney has satisfied the pattern 
requirement245 or whether he or she has the requisite mens rea. It is hard to 
understand, however, why doing the very same act can amount to "conducting 
the affairs of the enterprise" if done by corporate counsel but not if done by 
outside counsel. The difference must be found elsewhere.246 
Reves does not support a broad reading that extends an immunity to 
providers of professional services. 247 Such an immunity contravenes policy and 
the legislative history. 248 A question therefore remains as to how the Court 
might draw a better line when it ultimately returns to the meaning of§ 1962(c). 
Decisions like Sassoon and Baumer would make sense only if Reves turned on 
a concern, unstated by the Court, that RICO was unfairly applied to deep 
pocket professionals. 249 
Alternatively, many of the cases reading Reves broadly have involved mail 
fraud and securities fraud, and have allowed RICO its broadest reach. Mail 
fraud federalizes and then trebles damages caused by common law fraud, which 
would be actionable only under state law but for RICO. 250 RICO actions based 
on securities fraud alter the legal landscape worked out by Congress in a highly 
specialized field of securities law, arguably beyond congressional intent. 251 But 
if that is the policy underlying Reves, one wonders why only outside 
professionals escape liability while other business people are still subject to 
liability under RICO. 
245 H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229 (1989). 
246 See infra text accompanying notes 283-368. 
247 See supra text accompanying notes 138-87. 
248 See supra text accompanying notes 41-46. 
249 See supra text accompanying notes 152-87. 
250 See supra text accompanying notes 158-61. 
251 See supra text accompanying notes 167-71. 
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B. Directing Underlings 
Morin v. Trupin demonstrates the protracted litigation that can arise in a 
RICO case.252 Morin's tortuous history may explain the frustration some 
federal judges feel in dealing with RICO cases.253 
The Morin litigation involved various groups of investors in real estate 
limited partnerships syndicated by defendant Trupin through interconnected 
companies and partnerships that made the offers to the plaintiff-investors. 254 
The plaintiffs alleged that private placement memoranda were fraudulent in 
failing to reveal Trupin's involvement.255 Plaintiffs named as a defendant a 
New York law firm alleged to have prepared tax opinions used in the 
memoranda. This law firm also represented Trupin in an audit before the 
IRS.256 
The district court granted the law firm's motion to dismiss. The court's 
analysis was broader than in the professional services cases, though closely 
related to those decisions. The district court found that "there is no suggestion 
that the . . . defendants ever directed anyone to do anything. "257 The court 
recognized that the lawyers may have had "persuasive power to induce 
management to take certain actions," but that the power to influence is not 
equivalent to the power to direct; in order to impose liability the Reves court 
required a power to direct. 258 
United States v. Altman demonstrates that at least some lower federal 
courts are willing to read Reves broadly even in criminal cases.259 The 
Surrogates Court of New York County appointed the defendant as an executor 
for an estate, a conservator for a mentally incompetent person, and a receiver 
for a company. The defendant was accused of having "looted" the estate, 
252 823 F. Supp. 201 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). 
253 The proceedings in this case are many. See Morin v. Trupin, n8 F. Supp. 711 
(S.D.N.Y. 1991), reh'g granted, 809 F. Supp. 1081 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), on reargument, 823 
F. Supp. 201 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); Morin v. Trupin, 832 F. Supp. 93 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); Morin 
v. Trupin, 799 F. Supp. 342 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); Morin v. Trupin, 747 F. Supp. 1051 
(S.D.N.Y. 1990); Morin v. Trupin, 738 F. Supp. 98 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); Morin v. Trupin, 
711 F. Supp. 97 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Morin v. Trupin, 728 F. Supp. 952 (S.D .N.Y. 1989); 
see also Ahmed v. Trupin, 809 F. Supp. 1100 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); Ahmed v. Trupin, 781 F. 
Supp. 1017 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). 
254 Morin, 823 F. Supp. at 203-04. 
255 /d. 
256 /d. at 204. 
257 Morin, 832 F. Supp. at 98. 
258 /d. The court also concluded that providing legal services is not within § 1962(c). 
/d. 
259 820 F. Supp. 794 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). 
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conservatorship, and receivership. In a multicount indictment, the government 
alleged a violation of § 1962(c). The alleged enterprise was the New York 
Surrogates Court. 260 
The district court dismissed the § 1962(c) count because "there [was] no 
suggestion that [the defendant] ever 'directed' anyone else to do anything. "261 
The conclusion that one must direct another to meet the Reves test is apparently 
grounded in the language in Reves to the effect that § 1962(c) does not extend 
"beyond those who participate in the operation or management of an 
enterprise. "262 
As with the cases creating an immunity for providers of services, Morin 
and Altman are at least factually distinguishable from Reves. In an earlier 
opinion in Morin, the court found that the complaint alleged sufficient "primary 
wrongdoer securities fraud under Rule 1 O(b)" to withstand a motion to 
dismiss. 263 The complaint alleged a variety of omissions among the bases of 
liability.264 It also alleged a number of affirmative acts committed by the 
lawyers, including the preparation of "false and/or misleading tax opinions and 
tax information. "265 The complaint also alleged that in preparing a private 
placement memorandum, the defendants concealed information from 
investors. 266 
As indicated above, courts construing Reves have typically ignored the 
underlying securities fraud theory that the plaintiffs in Reves relied upon. The 
underlying theory was that the auditors failed to speak up at the board 
meeting.267 The accountants' full audit disclosed how the auditors had valued 
the gasohol plan. 268 That choice may have been negligent and the auditors' 
260 /d. at 795. 
261 /d. at 796. 
262/d. at 795 (citing Reves v. Ernst & Young, 113 S. Ct. 1163, 1172 (1993)). See 
Amalgamated Bank: of New York v. Marsh, 823 F. Supp. 209 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). The 
plaintiff bank employed defendant Marsh for over nine years, during which time he was 
able to embezzle almost $9 million from the bank. Part of his scheme involved depositing 
money to the account of Viva Pancho. According to the plaintiff, Viva Pancho's fraud 
consisted of making "material misrepresentations to [plaintiftl by receiving, accepting and 
depositing the proceeds of numerous . . • checks . .. with knowledge that the checks were 
wrongfully procured." Bank of New York, 823 F. Supp. at 217. The court dismissed a 
§ 1962(c) claim against Viva Pancho in reliance on Allman 's requirement that a § 1962(c) 
defendant must actually direct someone else. ld. at 220. 
263 Morin v. Trupin, 778 F. Supp. 711 , 725 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). 
264 ld. at 720-21. 
265 /d. at 720. 
266 /d. at 720-21. 
267 See supra notes 193-266 and infra notes 268-81. 
268 Reves v. Ernst & Young, 937 F.2d 1310, 1318 (8th Cir. 1991), ajfd, 113 S. Ct. 
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failure to reveal information may have been a breach of their duty, and in 
violation of the securities law. By comparison, the plaintiffs in Morin and 
Altman alleged active fraud, not a failure to reveal when the duty arose, but the 
fraudulent misrepresentations in the private placement memorandum. 269 
The Morin and Altman courts improperly extended Reves to claims of 
affirmative misrepresentation. The Reves Court did not impose a requirement 
that an outsider, otherwise associated with the enterprise, must direct or have 
responsibility to direct others to meet the requirements of§ 1962(c). The Reves 
Court stated that "'conduct' . . . indicates some degree of direction. "270 The 
Reves Court also stated that "'participate' [means]-'to take part in.'"271 
Understood together, the terms mean that "RICO liability is not limited to 
those with a formal position in the enterprise, but some part in directing the 
enterprise's affairs is required. "272 The Court stated that the "'operation or 
management' test expresses this requirement in a formulation that is easy to 
apply. "273 The Court also noted that it did not have to decide "how far section 
1962(c) extends down the ladder of operation because it is clear that Arthur 
Young was not acting under the direction of the Co-Qp's officers or board. "274 
It may be implied that one might be a § 1962( c) defendant if one takes rather 
than gives directions, at least insofar as the employer is implementing 
managerial decisions. 
The Court said that one need not direct another to meet the Reves' test. The 
Reves' test is satisfied not only if one manages the enterprise but also if one 
operates the enterprise. "Management" may imply that one has responsibility 
for directing others. "Operation" does not have a similar meaning; quite the 
contrary, "operate" as in "operative" may imply that one is a line worker, not 
a manager. 215 
Further support is found in Reves, where the court held that an outsider 
who committed bribery may meet its test: "An enterprise also might be 
'operated' or 'managed' by others 'associated with' the enterprise who exert 
1163, 1174 (1993). 
269 Morin v. Trupin, 778 F. Supp. 711, 720-21 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); United States v. 
Albnan, 820 F.Supp. 794, 795 (S.D.N. Y. 1993). 
270 Reves, 113 S. Ct. at 1169. 
271 /d. at 1170. 
272/d. 
273 /d. 
274 /d. at 1174 
275 "Operati .. . d fined "-'·'"ed km . h . , ve 18 e as a IIIUll wor an; . . . an artisan; . . . a mec aruc. 
"Operation" is defined as the condition of being in action or at work. WFBSTER'S NEW 
UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 1253 (2d ed. 1983). Reves specifically rejected a 
requirement that a § 1962(c) defendant must have significant control or be in the upper 
management of an enterprise. Reves, 113 S. Ct. at 1170. 
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control over it as, for example, by bribery. "276 If the Court means to suggest 
that any person offering a bribe operates or manages the affairs of the 
enterprise, cases like Altman and Morin are wrong. One who commits bribery 
does not necessarily direct another person. In many bribery situations, the 
official who is bribed is doing the directing. 277 Even if the briber is not the 
party demanding the bribee to perform his or her job, the briber is guilty of 
bribery even if the bribee does not change his or her job performance as a 
result of accepting the bribe. 278 This suggests an element of freedom on the 
part of the bribee, in that the briber is guilty of bribery even if the briber has 
been entirely ineffective and unable to direct anyone. It is more accurate to 
speak of the briber as attempting to influence rather than attempting to direct in 
many bribery cases. 279 
By comparison, a lawyer in a case like Morin probably has as much 
influence over a client as a briber has over an official.280 Likewise, the 
defendant in Altman manipulated the surrogate court in its job, just as a briber 
expects to manipulate the bribee by paying a bribe. 281 
VII. PROPOSED ANALYSIS 
Reves left more questions unanswered than resolved. 282 As argued above, 
276 Reves, 113 S. Ct. at 1173. 
277 See, e.g., Dixson v. United States, 465 U.S. 482, 485 (1983); United States v. 
Arroyo, 581 F.2d 649, 651 (7th Cir. 1978), art. deniM, 439 U.S. 1069 (1979). 
278 United States v. Anderson, 509 F.2d 312, 332 (D.C. Cir. 1974), art. denied, 420 
u.s. 991 (1975). 
279 See, e.g., United States v. Woods, 915 F.2d 854, 862-63 (3d Cir.), art. denied, 
499 U.S. 947 (1993); United States v. Dischner, 974 F.2d 1502, 1507 (9th Cir. 1992), art. 
denied, 113 S. Ct. 1290 (1993); United States v. Friedman, 854 F.2d 535, 558-59 (2d Cir. 
1988), art. denied, 490 U.S. 1004 (1989). 
280 See Jeffrey N. Shapiro, Comment, Attorney liability Under RICO § 1962(c) #fer 
Reves v. Ernst & Young, 61 U. CHI. L. REv. 1153, 1174 (1994). 
281 United States v. Altman, 820 F. Supp. 794, 795 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). In fact, the 
defendant in A.llmma is more likely to succeed in his criminal scheme than is the briber. The 
briber can succeed only if he is dealing with a corrupt official while the lawyer in Altman 
could succeed in his criminal scheme as long as no one discovered the misrepresentations in 
the papers filed with the court. 
282 Reves bas produced considerable confusion among commentators as well as among 
courts. For example, two authors believe that Reves represents a significant impairment on a 
prosecutor's ability to bring charges against Mafia foot soldiers because .. [t)he soldier in an 
organized crime family does not control or manage the affairs of the godfather's 
enterprise-the godfather does. The soldier follows orders." Ira H. Raphaelson & Michelle 
D. Bernard, RICO and the "Operation or Management" Test: 1he Potential Olilling Effect 
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the Court did not address how other courts should resolve the liability of 
professionals who take affirmative steps to assist the enterprise. 283 The Court 
did not resolve how far down the organizational ladder its holding should be 
applied.284 In dicta, the Court suggested that an outsider bribing an insider 
could be characterized as conducting the affairs of the enterprise. 28S Despite the 
Court's view that its test is clear, 286 the Reves' test may be satisfied if a person 
has a role in the operation, not just the management, of an enterprise. 287 
Operation is a potentially expansive concept. 
Post-Reves cases have focused on the requirement that a defendant must 
manage the affairs of the enterprise. These cases have ignored the more flexible 
on Oiminal Proseeulions, 28 U. RicH. L. REv. 669, 699 (1994). This interpretation is 
supported by Reves, but ignores other aspects of the Reves analysis. 
Co-authors G. Robert Blakey and Marc Haefner have argued that liability may attach 
even in cases like Reves if a plaintiff relies on principles of conspiracy and aiding and 
abetting. See Blakey & Haefner, supra note 26, at 1, 3-4. But they also proposed a 
surprisingly begrudging interpretation of Reves in various business settings when the 
enterprise alleged is not an associationin-fact. For example, they proposed that courts should 
rely on precedent interpreting the National Labor Relations Act to define Reves' operation 
or management test. They urged that the question ought to be whether a person exercised "a 
great deal of control" over a fraudulent scheme. ld. at 6. Apart from the obvious problem 
of line drawing, the proposed analysis seems to reintroduce the test adopted by the District 
of Columbia Circuit, limiting § 1962(c) to those in "upper management," a test explicitly 
rejected in Reves v. Ernst & Young, 113 S. Ct. 1163, 1173 (1993). Reliance on analogies 
from labor law also would appear especially inappropriate in the RICO setting. Given 
Congress' long support for union democracy, policy underlying federal labor laws would 
militate in favor of drawing a line nearer to upper management with management as 
oppoeed to operational responsibilities. RICO is a different creature than labor law. For 
example, the monolithic Mafia, RICO's original target, is hierarchical and dictatorial, doing 
ita business through loyal underlings. 
A thoughtful student comment correctly argued that lower federal courts have 
misapplied Reves. See Shapiro, supra note 280, at 1169. The comment argues for a three 
factor test to be analyzed to determine if the "legal services are so intimately related to the 
operation or management of an enterprise" to satisfy the Reves test: Reves would be 
IBtiafied first, if counsel usurps management responsibility; second, if counsel initiates the 
legal aervices; third, if counsel exercised persuasive power over the client. /d. at 1170-73. 
While those would appear to be sufficient to satisfy Reves, this Article has argued that Reves 
was narrower than that and may be satisfied on some lesser showing than the one proposed 
in the student comment. See supra notes 193-281. 
283 See supra notes 147-87. 
284 Reves, 113 S. Ct. at 1173 n.9. 
28S ld. at 1173. 
286 ld. at 1170. 
287 ld. 
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term "operation" in the Reves test. That the underlying offenses in Reves were 
based on a failure to act has also been ignored in the post-Reves cases. In doing 
so, the lower federal courts may have effectuated some of the policies unstated 
in Reves. Post-Reves developments, however, are troubling. One can only 
guess what policies the Court may have intended to advance and so one cannot 
determine whether those policies are well served by the current rules developed 
by the lower federal courts. 288 
Most of the post-Reves decisions involve civil litigation.289 There, it may 
be tempting to limit RICO's breadth. But interpretations of RICO are fully 
applicable in civil and criminal RICO proceedings. 290 Hence, a begrudging rule 
in civil RICO cases, articulated out of concern, for example, about rules of 
joint and several liability, may come back to haunt a court in a criminal RICO 
prosecution. Given that RICO was intended primarily as a criminal statute with 
civil liability as an afterthought, 291 narrowing RICO to meet the problems 
faced in civil RICO cases may be allowing the civil tail to wag the criminal 
dog. 
The two lines of cases discussed above292 and the scholarly efforts to limit 
the management test to traditional business managers293 are contrary to RICO's 
legislative history. Senators McClellan and Hruska, and ultimately Congress, 
were heavily influenced by the Katzenbach Commission's report.294 The 
Commission identified the structure of the Mafia. The Mafia was defined by its 
hierarchy, starting with the Commission overarching twenty-four Mafia 
families. 295 The families were organized along identifiable lines of authority, 
288 See supra notes 152-87. 
289 As of February 1995, 354 cases have cited Reves v. Ernst & Young, 113 S. Ct. 
1163 (1993), of which 82 were criminal and 272 were civil. Search of LEXIS, Shepards 
(Feb. 4, 1995). 
290 Critics claim that RICO encourages frivolous lawsuits because it offers a private 
plaintiff the advantages of a federal forum and the prospect of treble damages and attorneys' 
fees. See Crovitz, supra note 6, at 65 (stating that RICO offers the lure of treble damages 
plus lawyers fees to plaintiffs who bring private actions for damages against private 
defendants). See also Tarlow, supra note 3, at 169. One commentator bas argued that RICO 
ought to be interpreted differently depending on whether it is the basis of a civil or criminal 
action. See Bryan T. Camp, Dual Construction of RICO: The Road Not Taken in Reves, 51 
WASH. & I...EBL. REv. 61, 82 (1994). 
1. 
36. 
291 See Lynch, supra note 2, at 707. 
292 See supra notes 193-281. 
293 See Blakey & Haefner, supra note 26, at 1; see also, Pitts et al., supra note 193, at 
294 See Lynch, supra note 2, at 673-80. 
295 See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 31, at 7-10; Cressey, supra note 39, at 31-
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with n Capo or the Boss at its head, aided by his Underboss or Sottocapo and 
the Counselor or Consiglieri. Below these authorities were underbosses, 
lieutenants or Capodecina, section chiefs and soldiers. 296 The Katzenbach 
Commission identified the Mafia's code of conduct for its members which 
consisted of rules to govern its membership. 297 The Commission further 
described the ritual by which one became a "made man" or member of the 
Mafia.29B Subsequently, Congress had in mind a distinct organization with an 
identifiable structure. Congress identified a social evil-the amassing of capital 
and interference with free competition-that was accomplished by deliberate, 
concerted activity by members of a hierarchical organization. 299 
A prosecutor must be able to criminalize lower echelon members of the 
Mafia because the failure to do so leaves junior operatives ready to take over 
management positions in the organization. Hence, § 1962(c) is not limited to 
those who manage the affairs of the enterprise; it includes those who operate its 
affairs through racketeering activity as well. 
Reliance on the analogy to the Mafia demonstrates that Congress intended 
to criminalize soldiers or lower echelon employees or associates. This Article 
has argued that courts have read Reves too broadly by ignoring the fact that the 
auditors' predicate offenses were based on omissions and by ignoring the 
"operation" part of the Reves' test.300 Misreading Reves has lead some 
commentators to suggest that § 1962(c) may no longer apply to Mafia foot 
soldiers.301 
The Court created much of the confusion with inconsistent statements in 
Reves.3CYl It also left unexplored the meaning of "operation," thereby leaving 
itself latitude in future RICO cases. This Article does not attempt to give a 
single definition of "operation." Instead, what follows are several recurring 
situations in which "operation or management" must be given meaningful 
content and a proposed analysis relying on both the language of§ 1962(c) and 
its legislative history. 
56. 
296 Seeid. 
297 See TASKFORCE REPoRT, supra note 31, at 10; Cressey, supra note 39, at 47-50. 
298 See TASK FORCE REPoRT, supra note 31, at 6-10; Cressey, supra note 39, at 54-
299 See Lynch, supra note 2, at 667 (discussing Congress' attempts to define organized 
crime); see also TASK FORCE REPoRT, supra note 31, at 1-2. 
300 See supra notes 193-281. 
301 "- Rap .x:e haelson & Bernard, supra note 282, at 699. 
302 See ilifra notes 310-22. 
1402 OHIO STA.'IE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 56:1363 
A. Down 1he Ladder 
Courts have often cited the example of an employee of a large automaker 
during working hours, who regularly extorts money from his fellow 
workers.303 He is obviously employed by the corporation and is engaging in a 
pattern of racketeering. One easy answer for why he is not guilty under § 
1962(c) is that the corporation is not engaged in the business of extortion. But 
that depends. If corporate management directed lower echelon employees to 
extort money, the analysis of the example might change. An example involving 
more realistic corporate behavior may make the point more clearly: the same 
hypothetical employee may engage in a number of acts of bribery during the 
work day. Bribery may be done to advance corporate interests;304 for example, 
an environmental protection agency inspector may be bribed to overlook a 
violation of federal or local environmental laws. If those acts of bribery are at 
the direction of upper management or are done to advance his employer's 
business, § 1962(c) would appear to be satisfied. 
In the previous example, the defendant was associated with or employed by 
the corporation; he engaged in a pattern of racketeering; the affairs of the 
enterprise, e.g., selling automobiles, were advanced by the acts of bribery. The 
difference between this example and the initial example of the employee merely 
extorting money from fellow employees, is best understood in terms of mens 
rea. Like the "made man, "305 the second hypothetical defendant has engaged in 
criminal activity to advance the interests of the enterprise. 
That a person who acts with the purpose of advancing the interests of the 
enterprise is guilty under § 1962( c) would appear noncontroversial. 306 What 
complicates the issue even if the actor's conduct benefits the organization is 
Reves itself. In Reves, the accountants may have remained silent at the Co-op 
board meeting in order to prevent revelation about the enterprise's 
insolvency.307 Thus, the Court may have implicitly found that acting for the 
303 United States v. Dennis, 625 F.2d 782, 790 (8th Cir. 1980) (referring to an 
employee of General Motors who collected unlawful debts on factory premises). See United 
States v. Cauble, 706 F.2d 1322, 1332 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1005 (1984). 
304 See, e.g. , United States v. Dischner, 974 F.2d 1502 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 
113 S. Ct. 1290 (1993). 
305 See TASK FORCE REPoRT, supra note 31, at 6-10; Cressey, supra note 39, at 54-
56; MMs, supra note 33, at 38-39. 
306 United States v. Scotto, 641 F.2d 47, 54 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 
961 (1981). Even though one may violate § 1962(c) without an intent to benefit the 
enterprise, such a desire would appear to be sufficient to meet the "participate in the 
conduct" language of§ 1962(c). 
307 Reves v. Ernst & Young, 113 S. Ct. 1163, 1167-68 (1993). 
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benefit of the enterprise is insufficient without more to violate § 1962(c). 
Further, Reves stated that a § 1962(c) defendant must have "some part in 
directing the enterprise's affairs. "308 Hence, if an employee bribes an EPA 
official at the direction of his superior, one might argue that the employee has 
been directed, but has no part in directing the enterprise's affairs. 
Again, Reves' unusual facts call for a narrow interpretation of its holding. 
While the Court stated that one must have "some part in directing" the affairs 
of the enterprise, it also stated that an enterprise's affairs are also within its 
operation and management test when "lower-rung participants .. . are under 
the direction of upper management. "309 The Court's actual holding involved a 
situation in which the Court found specifically that the accountants' "failure to 
tell the Co-op's board" additional information did not meet its test.310 The 
plaintiffs in Reves did not rely on a claim that the accountants actively 
misrepresented the financial status of their client in order to conceal its 
insolvency. This Article has argued that the Court simply did not address that 
issue and that, should the Court do so, active fraud would come within § 
1962(c)'s "conduct" or "participate in the conduct" language.311 
An individual acting to benefit the enterprise and also meeting the pattern 
requirement should fall within § 1962(c) whether he or she is formally 
employed by an enterprise or only "associated" with the enterprise. Here, a 
mens rea requirement, the purpose of benefiting the enterprise, also serves to 
establish the association with the enterprise. "Associated" is defined as "united 
in company or in interest; joined; accompanying. "312 An "association" is, 
among other things, a "union," "a society formed for transacting or carrying 
on some business or pursuit for mutual advantage"; as a verb, "associate" 
means "to unite as friends, partners, etc.; join for a common purpose. "313 
Rephrased, § 1962(c) would appear to be satisfied when a defendant, united in 
interest with the enterprise, for example, by a desire to advance the interests of 
the enterprise, engages in a pattern of racketeering.314 
308 ld. at 1170. 
309 /d. at 1173. 
310 ld. at 1174. 
311 See supra notes 226-51, 268-81. 
312 WEBSTER's NEW UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED DICfiONARY 113 (2d ed. 1983). 
313 ld. For a careful analysis of the mens rea requirement in § 1962(c) see United 
States v. Castellano, 610 F. Supp. 1359, 1395-96 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). 
314 Whether RICO contains a mens rea requirement has divided lower federal courts. 
Barry Tarlow, RICO Revisited, 17 GA. L. REv. 291, 383 (1983). For example, some lower 
federal courts have held that the only mens rea required for a § 1962(c) violation is the 
proof of the mens rea required by the predicate offenses while other courts have required 
80IDe additional knowledge or voluntary association with the enterprise. /d. at n.384 and the 
cues cited therein. 
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interests of the enterprise) in conjunction with the pattern requirement makes an 
outsider look like an insider. The requirement of continuity found in "pattern" 
means that the defendant has associated with the enterprise over a period of 
time;318 mens rea demonstrates that the defendant shares the goals of the 
enterprise and thus certainly advances the affairs of the enterprise. Focusing on 
mens rea avoids artificial line drawing between outsiders who may be liable 
and "complete outsiders. "319 
Acting to benefit the enterprise through continuous criminal activity would 
appear to be sufficient to meet the requirements of § 1962(c). A difficult 
question is whether this ought to be a necessary condition of liability. Courts 
have recognized that a defendant may be able to commit certain crimes because 
he holds a key position within an organization. 320 A union leader, for example, 
may be able to extract a tribute from a shipper who requires the services of 
union members under the unionist's control; the leader does not intend to 
benefit the union, but instead intends only to line his own pockets.321 
Prior to Reves, the Second Circuit gave the broadest interpretation to § 
1962(c)'s requirement of "participation in the conduct" of the affairs of the 
enterprise. It required either that a person is "enabled to commit the predicate 
offenses solely by virtue of his position in the enterprise or involvement in or 
control over the affairs of the enterprise" or that "the predicate offenses are 
related to the activities of that enterprise. "322 While Reves implicitly rejected 
that approach, 323 the unionist example would presumably come within Reves' 
management test simply by virtue of the person's management position within 
the union. 
318 H.J. Inc. , v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U .S. 229, 242-43 (1989). 
319 Reves, 113 S. Ct. atll73. 
320 See United States v. Scotto, 641 F.2d 47, 54 {2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 
961 (1981); United States v. Cauble, 706 F.2d 1322, 1332-33 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 
465 u.s. 1005 (1984). 
321 Scotto, 641 F.2d at 54. See United States v. Provenzano, 688 F .2d 194, 199 (3d 
Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1071 (1982). 
322 Scotto, 641 F.2d at 54. 
323 In Reves, the Court explained its grant of certiorari by reference to the conflict 
among lower federal courts. Reves, 113 S. Ct. at 1169. For cases which represent the 
conflict, see Bennett v. Berg, 710 F.2d 1361, 1364 (8th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 
1008 (1983); Yellow Bus Lines, Inc. v. Drivers, Chauffeurs & Helpers Local Union 639, 
913 F.2d 948, 954 (D.C. Cir. 1990), ceTt. denied, 501 U.S. 1222 (1991); Bank of America 
Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n v. Touche Ross & Co., 782 F.2d 966, 970 (11th Cir. 1986). The 
Court adopted Bennett. Courts that have considered the question have found implicit in 
Reves a rejection of Scotto's test, presumably on the assumption that Bennett was more 
restrictive than the Second Circuit's test. See, e.g., Amalgamated Bank of N.Y. v. Marsh, 
823 F. Supp. 209, 220 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). 
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If rank and file members of the union engaged in a pattern of racketeering, 
their liability under § 1962(c) might turn, as argued above, on their mens rea 
and on whether they were acting under the direction of union officials. 324 
Where they were acting on their own behalf, under the Second Circuit 
approach, the issue would be whether their predicate offenses related to the 
activities of the enterprise.325 Under Reves, the issue is whether their conduct 
amounted to operating the enterprise. 326 Reves did little to explain the meaning 
of "operate," leaving itself ample latitude in defining the sweep of § 
1962(c).327 
The appropriate analysis is found in yet another court's interpretation of§ 
1962(c), that of the Fifth Circuit in United States v. 0Juble.328 OJuble, in 
effect, cojoined Scotto's disjunctive requirements. Thus, an actor conducts the 
activities of the enterprise when he is able to commit the offense by virtue of 
his position and the offenses related to the activities of the enterprise. 329 For 
example, an employee who works for a governor and has responsibility for 
reviewing grants of clemency and misrepresents that the governor will grant 
clemency, if bribed, would be within the provisions of§ 1962(c). The test has 
the benefit of limiting application of§ 1962(c) in cases in which a mail clerk in 
an enterprise committed a pattern of racketeering only remotely related to the 
enterprises• business activity.330 If, for example, a mail clerk in a governor's 
office misrepresented himself as having the power to review clemency 
petitions, he would not appear to meet the conjunctive test. 
Cases would fall into two general categories: (1) a defendant would come 
within § 1962(c), whether an insider or outsider, if he or she had the requisite 
mens rea to benefit the enterprise by committing the predicate offenses;331 or 
(2) a defendant would be liable under§ 1962(c) even if he or she acted contrary 
to the interests of the enterprise, the affairs of which he or she conducted, if he 
or she was able to commit the offenses because of his or her position in the 
enterprise and the predicate offenses were related to the activities of the 
enterprise. 332 
324 See supra notes 303-15. 
32S Scotto, 641 F.2d at 54. 
326 Reves, 113 S. Ct. at 1173. 
327 See supra notes 129-36, 275-81. 
328 706 F.2d 1322 (Sth Cir. 1983), cen. denied, 465 U.S. 1005 (1984). Despite the 
fact that Cauble predates Reves, this Article contends that adoption of its approach is not 
foreclosed by Reves because the Court has yet to determine RICO's mens rea requirement. 
329 Jd. at 1332. 
330 ld. at 1332 n.22. 
331 See supra notes 303-19. 
332 See supra notes 320-30. 
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C. Bribers After Reves 
Even though the proposed analysis would extend§ 1962(c) liability beyond 
that found in some of the post-Reves cases, it would also limit § 1962(c) in 
some recurring cases. One example is found in United States v. Yonan in which 
the defendant Yonan, a defense attorney, repeatedly bribed a member of the 
state's attorney's office in exchange for favorable treatment for his clients.333 
The Seventh Circuit held that Yonan was properly charged under § 
1962(c), rejecting Yonan's argument that he was not employed by or associated 
with the enterprise because he acted to "undermine the office and thus had no 
interest in its goals. "334 The court found no express statutory requirement that 
a person have a stake or interest in the goals of the enterprise. The court 
concluded that by giving a "common sense" reading of "association," a person 
"can associate with the enterprise by conducting business with it. "335 
A common sense reading of association is questionable. For example, an 
association is defined as a "partnership[,] . . . union or connection of ideas. "336 
Yonan may have had a union, partnership or conspiracy with a corrupt state's 
attorney, but he did not have a connection of ideas with the state's attorney's 
office. 
Despite the Court's dicta in Reves, suggesting that its test may be met in 
bribery cases, 337 it is hard to understand how a defendant like Yonan managed 
or operated the state's attorney's office. He had no management position. At 
most, one might argue that he "operated" the enterprise by influencing a 
decision maker in that organization-a far cry from having a part in directing 
the affairs of the enterprise. If "operate" means only to have some effect on the 
enterprise, the Second Circuit's test in Scotto, presumably rejected by Reves, 
would be resuscitated.338 Furthermore, if that were the standard, the 
accountants' inaction had some effect on the affairs of the Co-<:>p. Had the 
accountants spoken at the first board meeting, the Co-{)p would have had a run 
on its demand notes, forcing it into bankruptcy as much as a year earlier.339 
Thus, if to "operate" means only "to have an effect on," the accountants would 
have been liable under § 1962(c). 
Reves does little to explicate the meaning of "operate," other than by 
333 800 F.2d 164, 167-68 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. <knied, 479 U.S. 1055 (1987). 
334 /d. at 167. 
335 /d. 
336 WEBSTER'S NEW UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 113 (2d ed. 1983). 
337 Reves v. Ernst & Young, 113 S. Ct. 1163, 1173 (1993). 
338 See supra note 323. 
339 Reves, 113 S. Ct. at 1168. 
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implication. The accountants, whose silence had an effect on the enterprise, did 
not "operate" the enterprise. Reves attempted to limit § 1962(c)'s broad sweep. 
Cauble's twin requirements impose a meaningful limitation on § 1962(c) and 
would force the Court to reexamine its casual dicta that one engaging in bribery 
may conduct the affairs of the enterprise.340 Under Cauble, a briber's conduct 
was related to the activity of the enterprise, but the briber was not able to 
commit the acts of bribery by virtue of his position in the enterprise. 
This comports with the discussion of bribery in the Katzenbach 
Commission's report. The report identified the Mafia's use of bribery to 
corrupt the system by gaining control over politicians, judges, and police.341 
But in that context, a Mafioso conducted the affairs of the Mafia, not the 
judge's or politician's office, through a pattern of racketeering.342 
By analogy, Yonan may have operated his own law practice through a 
pattern of racketeering. That places no strain on the language of§ 1962(c). One 
might question, given that the briber may be guilty under§ 1962(c) as long as 
the right enterprise is pled, that the difference is form over substance. But there 
are meaningful differences between being charged with operating one enterprise 
or another. 
That difference can be illustrated by reference to United States v. 
Manzella.343 In Manzella, "Junior" Provenzano was the "kingpin of a 
Louisiana crime organization. "344 His organization consisted of several men 
who regularly engaged in criminal acts, including arson for hire, extortion, and 
mail fraud. 345 Provenzano was indicted, but most of his regular cohorts were 
not. 346 Instead, his codefendants included a number of people who purchased 
Provenzano's organization's services. For example, one defendant, "suffer[ing] 
many marital difficulties, resolved to end his problems by destroying the 
property of his estranged wives. "347 Provenzano's group agreed to commit two 
340 United States v. Cauble, 706 F.2d 1322, 1332 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 
u.s. 1005 (1984). 
341 See TASKFORCE REPoRT, supra note 31 , at 6; Cressey, supra note 39, at 25. 
342 There has been an active debate whether RICO is limited to organized crime. 
Blakey & Perry, supra note 92, at 862. But no one doubts that RICO was designed to 
outlaw the Mafia; that was the classic "enterprise" within the meaning of RICO. And as 
indicated, one way in which the Mafia conducted its affairs was through a pattern of 
bribery. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 31, at 6 . 
343 782 F.2d 533 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1123 (1986). 
344 /d. at 536. 
345 /d. 
346 Provenzano's regular cohorts were not tried as codefendants. According to the 
court, most of them had cooperated with the government and appeared as prosecution 
witnesses. /d. at 544. 
347 /d. at 536. 
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acts of arson. 348 Another codefendant had the group bum down a building so 
that he could defraud his insurance company, 349 while yet another codefendant 
had Provenzano's men "steal" his car, also to collect insurance proceeds.350 
Provenzano's "customers" were charged with violating § 1962(c); the 
enterprise alleged was the Provenzano organization.351 As a result, each 
customer was forced to go to trial with the other customers in a long and 
complex proceeding. 352 Group trials have obvious disadvantages and potential 
for prejudice, including the risk of guilt by association and jury confusion. 353 
The defendant's ability to defend effectively is limited by the significant legal 
fees associated with a trial that may last weeks or monfus.354 The alternative 
would be to charge each individual customer with operating the affairs of a 
different enterprise, one consisting of the individual defendant and the 
Provenzano group, an association-in-fact. 355 In that case, there would be no 
basis upon which the government could join all of the customers in a single 
case. 
The prosecutor gained legal advantage in a case like Manzella by the 
prosecutor's ability to charge the individuals with operating the affairs of 
Provenzano's enterprise. For example, that enterprise had a distinct existence 
348/d. 
349 ld. 
350 /d. In this last instance, the court recognized that the defendant did not engage in a 
pattern of racketeering activity insofar as be agreed to the commission of only one predicate 
offense. In the case of the other codefendants, the case was resolved before H.J. Inc. v. 
Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229 (1985). Under H.J. Inc., it might be argued that 
the defendants did not engage in a pattern of racketeering because, on the specific filets of 
the case, the criminal conduct was not sufficiently continuous. H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 250. 
351 MQIIUIJa, 782 F.2d at 536. 
352 RICO trials can be exceedingly long. Tarlow, supra note 3, at 169. RICO's 
complexity is suggested by the copious scholarly interest and the large number of issues that 
have divided lower federal courts. ld. In MQIIUl/a, for example, the court made references 
to some of the difficult and unresolved questions arising under RICO's complex provisions. 
MQIIUI/a, 782 F.2d at 537-38 n.2 (discussing the "fascinating conundrum" raised by 
charging a § 1962(d) conspiracy while relying on predicate offenses involving acts of 
conspiracy). 
353 See, e.g., Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 (1946); United States v. 
Sutherland, 656 F.2d 1181 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 949 (1982); United 
States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953 (1978). 
354 In RICO prosecutions, this problem may be compounded by having assets frozen 
because they may be subject to forfeiture. See United States v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600, 
602-06 (1989); Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 619-22 
(1989). 
355 MQIIUIJa, 782 F.2d at 538. 
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from the pattern of racketeering activity. 356 Were the government instead to 
charge each individual defendant with operating a separate enterprise, an 
association-in-fact along with the members of the Provenzano group, there 
would appear to be no separate proof of the enterprise and the pattern of 
racketeering. Subsequently, the evidence would probably be insufficient 
because the Court has suggested that in cases involving an association-in-fact, 
there must be some proof of an enterprise beyond commission of the predicate 
offenses. 357 Charging each enterprise separately might also demonstrate a lack 
of continuity to constitute a pattern of racketeering.358 
D. Customers and Reves 
Manzella is also illustrative of another group of cases in which the analysis 
proposed in this Article might produce a result different from current case law. 
In Manzella, the Fifth Circuit rejected the argument that a customer in an 
enterprise may not be charged under § 1962(c).359 The Court observed that a 
customer may engage in a pattern of racketeering and "[o]nce this is 
established, his status as a customer becomes irrelevant because Congress 
intended the prosecution of anyone whose actions fall afoul of § 1962(c). "360 
The Court glossed over the question of whether a customer's actions run afoul 
of§ 1962(c). They do run afoul of§ 1962(c) but only if§ 1962(c) is satisfied 
by the commission of two predicate offenses. It is widely recognized that, this 
alone, is insufficient. 361 
Applying Reves to the "customer" argument demonstrates some of the 
uncertainty of its test. A customer may or may not have a role in "directing" 
the conduct of the affairs of the enterprise. The purchase of arson services has 
an effect or influences the activity of the enterprise. Whether that is sufficient 
to meet the Reves test is doubtfu1.362 
Under this proposed analysis, the customer lacks the mens rea to advance 
356 An association-in-fact, composed of individuals whose only relationship was the 
commission of the relevant predicate offenses, might not be liable under RICO. That is due 
to the suggestion in Turkette that the enterprise and the pattern of racketeering were separate 
elements and that something in addition to the pattern of racketeering was necessary to 
demonstrate the existence of the enterprise. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 576, 
583 (1981). 
351 /d. at 583. 
358 H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 232 (1989). 
359 Manzella, 782 F.2d at 538. 
360 /d. 
361 Turkette, 452 U.S. at 583. &e Tarlow, supra note 314, at 346-47. 
362 &e supra notes 337-42. 
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the interests of the enterprise. 363 Hence, the question would be the extent to 
which the customer is enabled to commit the predicate offemes by virtue of his 
or bee position in the enterprise. Concededly, the second part of the test would 
be met if the predicate offenses relate to the activities of the enterprise. The 
"customer" in a case like Manzella has no position in the enterprise. He or she 
may have importance for the enterprise; but by analogy to customers of any 
commercial venture, it would not be said of Sears • customers that they have a 
position in Sears. 
That conclusion is supported by an understanding of the workings of the 
Mafia. The Mafia notoriously sells "protection" to various people.364 In the 
construction trade, it may sell labor peace, 365 or it may provide a customer an 
alternative to lengthy contract litigation. 366 For example, a subcontractor on a 
construction project may have difficulty collecting fees from the contractor. 
The Mafia often provides the contractor with incentive to pay off the 
subcontractor. There is no indication that Congress would sweep those parties 
into a prosecution along with members of the Mafia. 367 
Efforts to limit RICO to organized crime cases have been unsuccessfu1,368 
rightly so given that Congress specifically recognized that RICO would not 
apply exclusively to organized crime.369 But Congress' preoccupation with the 
Mafia offers relevant legislative history; organizations or individuals whose 
conduct has no resemblance to the Mafia seem doubtful targets for its draconian 
remedies. The virtue of the analysis proposed in this Article is its effort to pose 
some rational boundaries for§ 1962(c), resembling classic Mafia activity. 
Vlll. CONCLUSION 
Reves held that the accountants' failure to reveal information, a violation of 
a duty under the securities law, did not amount to a violation of§ 1962(c).370 
The reaction of some commentators37I and lower federal courts312 
363 See supra notes 300-32. 
364 See generally GoLDSTOCK, supra note 39, at 16-17. 
365 /d. 
366 /d. at 20. See generally Michael Vitiello, The Permanent Subcommiltee on 
Investigations Repo11 on Hotel Employees &: Restaurant Employees International Union: 
Will RICO Take a Walk on the Boardwalk with Local 54?, 16 RuroERS LJ. 671 (1985). 
367 See TASKFORCE REPoRT, supra note 31, at 16; Cressey, supra note 39, at 32. 
368 HJ. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 243 (1989). 
369 See Lynch, supra note 64, at m. 
370 Reves v. Ernst & Young, 113 S. Ct. 1163, 1174 (1993). 
371 Pitts et al., supra note 157, at 1. 
372 See supra notes 193- 281. 
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demonstrates frustration with RICO in the business setting in which RICO 
plaintiffs have sought deep pocket defendants. 
Like many commentators and lower federal courts, the Supreme Court may 
finally have seen the shortsightedness of its earlier RICO decisions in which the 
Court refused to impose any meaningful limitations on RICO's expansive 
language. For example, Sedima, the case that most deeply divided the Court, 
offered an opportunity to limit RICO in cases involving garden variety common 
law fraud, often disputes about soured business deals, not about the kind of evil 
that produced RIC0.373 The Court's failure to do so has increased the pressure 
to limit RIC0.374 
This Article has argued that Reves may reflect concern about the same 
policies that troubled the Sedima dissenters.375 Given the Court's deference to 
stare decisis in statutory construction cases,376 the Reves court was not in a 
position to reexamine limitations rejected in Sedima. But the Court's failure to 
articulate its policy concerns has meant that post-Reves cases have been 
confusing. 377 
Contrary to the view among several lower federal courts,378 Reves did not 
create a broad immunity for professionals. 379 Such an immunity would be 
contrary to congressional intent. 38° Congress recognized that the Mafia was 
able to maintain economic power through the use of professionals.381 RICO 
was designed to reach men like Lucky Luciano382 who could maintain control 
by directing others to commit predicate offenses. But RICO was intended to 
strike at the heart of organized crime, a goal which could not be accomplished 
by incarcerating only managers. Young muscle would remain ready to ascend 
to management positions.383 
This Article has argued that Congress' intent, expressed in § 1962(c), can 
be achieved by focusing on the mens rea requirement and whether the actor's 
position in the organization makes the commission of the crime possible. 384 
Reves does not foreclose what this Article has argued is a natural reading of § 
373 Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 525 (1985). 
374 See supra notes 93-113. 
315 See supra notes 152-89. 
376 See, e.g. , Patterson v. McClean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172 (1989). 
377 See supra notes 193-281. 
378 See supra notes 193-251. 
379 /d. 
380 /d. 
381 See supra notes 41-46. 
382 See generally TASK FORCE REPoRT, supra note 31, at 6-10; Cressey, supra note 
39, at 54-56. 
383 See supra notes 33-46, 63-67, 294-99. 
384 See supra notes 303-32. 
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1962(c).385 
With its decision in Reves, the Court has addressed most of RICO's 
substantive tenns. It has resolved neither the mens rea question, an issue that 
would permit a more natural reading of§ 1962(c) than that given by post-Reves 
decisions, nor the meaning of operation in its "operation or management" test. 
But given that the Court has addressed most of RICO's substantive provisions 
to date, the Court has little maneuvering room to produce meaningful 
limitations on runaway RICO. 
In that sense, Reves was a step in the right direction. Despite the Court's 
urging, Congress has been unable to reform RICO. The Court should take 
what few opportunities it will have to limit RICO, but doing so in a manner 
consistent with Congress' clear intent to fight the Mafia. 
385 See supra notes 301-69. 
